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LYING, STEALING, AND CHEATING:  
THE ROLE OF ARBITRATORS AS ETHICS ENFORCERS 
Kristen M. Blankley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Q: How can you tell if an attorney is about to lie?  A:  His lips move.   
 
Upon seeing an elderly lady for the drafting of her will, the attorney 
charged her $100.  She gave him a $100 bill, not noticing that it was stuck 
to another $100 bill.  On seeing the two bills stuck together, the ethical 
question came to the attorney's mind: “Do I tell my partner?”   
 
Q: The tooth fairy, an honest lawyer, and an expensive, dishonest 
lawyer are in the same room.  There is a $500 bill on a table in the room.  
When they leave, the money is gone.  Who took it?  A: Since there is no 
such thing as the tooth fairy or an honest lawyer, the answer is obvious.  
 
The National Institutes of Health have announced that they will no 
longer be using rats for medical experimentation.  In their place, they will 
use attorneys.  They have given three reasons for this decision:  (1) There 
are now more attorneys than there are rats.  (2) The medical researchers 
don't become as emotionally attached to the attorneys as they did to the rats.  
(3) No matter how hard you try, there are some things that rats won't do.
1
 
 
“Jokes” such as these regarding lawyers are commonplace and easy to 
find.  A quick search of the internet will uncover dozens of websites with 
hundreds of lawyer jokes.
2
  Although lawyers are not the only professionals 
subject to such joking, the public perception of lawyers as willing to lie, 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 *  Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law.  Many thanks to the people who 
helped throughout the editing and drafting process, including Steve Wilborn, Richard Moberly, Maureen 
Weston, Sarah Cole, and Ariana Levinson.  Thank you to the University of Louisville Brandeis School 
of Law for allowing me to present an early version of this paper at the annual Warns Arbitration 
Conference.  Many thanks to my research assistants, Justin Yates and Nick Holle, for their assistance.  
Thanks and love to Michael Douglass, Jr. 
 1  These lawyer “jokes” were all taken from the following website: 185 LAWYER JOKES, 
http://www.stromer.com/jokes/185jokes.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).   
        2  See, e.g., Douglas Adams, Lawyer Jokes: A Collection, http://people.ku.edu/~dadams/lawyers.htm (last 
updated Nov. 26, 2001); Peter Tiersma, Lawyer Jokes: Truth and Nonsense About the Legal Profession, 
LANGUAGEANDLAW.ORG, http://www.languageandlaw.org/JOKES.HTM (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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cheat, steal, and live beyond ethical boundaries is troubling and damaging 
to the profession.
3
  But as they say, all jokes are based on a kernel of truth. 
All joking aside, the availability of an honest, reputable, and impartial 
tribunal for dispute resolution is essential to build public confidence and 
trust.  Today’s American legal system, for the most part, carries the 
imprimatur of justice and bestows a relative level of confidence on those 
who seek to resolve disputes in a lawful manner.
4
  Without such confidence, 
a system of revenge and vigilante justice would likely have become the 
norm. 
The American justice system has certain hallmarks that help foster this 
sense of justice and give ease to participants that their disputes will be 
handled in a fair manner.  Judges are respected individuals who are either 
appointed or elected who serve outside of the political system.
5
  Courts and 
court filings are public and open to the press, which helps ensure the 
transparency of the process.
6
  Juries of peers must engage in group 
decision-making to arrive at a consensus or supermajority in order to issue a 
verdict in a case.
7
  Lawyers must certify that they are acting ethically when 
filing court documents,
8
 and judges have the ability to sanction lawyers, 
parties, and witnesses for engaging in wrongdoing.
9
  In addition, judges are 
required to abide by certain ethical codes
10
 and their reasoned opinions (for 
the most part) clearly show the judges’ reasoning in those situations. 
The arbitral forum, in contrast, does not command the same type of 
public trust as the formal court system.  Many types of arbitration are 
conducted outside of the public eye in either confidential proceedings or 
simply nonpublic proceedings.
11
  Naysayers often describe arbitration as 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 3  See Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political 
Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 806–07 (1998). 
 4  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012). 
 5  See generally Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr., Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular Elections are Preferable to 
Merit Selection Systems, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 4 (2004).  Although many state level judges are elected, and 
the states have differing laws regarding whether those judges may campaign using reference to their political 
parties, once these people become judges, they are expected to serve outside and “above” the political system. 
 6  See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (discussing the shared right 
between the public and the accused to a public trial). 
 7  See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 411 (1972). 
 8  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 9  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
 10  See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2010). 
 11  See Stefano Azzali, Confidentiality vs. Transparency in Commercial Arbitration: A False Contradiction 
to Overcome, CTR. FOR TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION, ARBITRATION AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/transnational/2012/12/confidentiality-vs-transparency-in-commercial-arbitration-a-
false/.  Many arbitrations are confidential because the parties agreed to hold the proceedings in confidence.  For 
some types of cases, such as labor cases, reporters of arbitral awards exist.  For many other types of cases, such as 
consumer cases and business cases, no such reporters exist, and it becomes difficult to locate arbitration awards. 
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“secret,” and imply that rampant bias and other horribles occur behind the 
closed doors of the arbitration tribunals.
12
  Arbitration has not been immune 
from criticism, particularly from scholars,
13
 public advocacy groups,
14
 and 
legislators,
15
 among others.
16
  Although this author has largely been a 
supporter of the arbitration process,
17
 I have only supported the process 
when that process is fair and conducted in an ethical manner. 
Previously, I have written articles on arbitration ethics, uncovering that 
the arbitration process is not only unregulated but also free from any state 
oversight.
18
  The ethical landscape for arbitration becomes even more 
troublesome given the rise in the application of judicial immunity for all 
participants in the arbitral forum, including attorneys, parties, and 
witnesses.
19
  I previously argued that certain legal changes should be 
implemented in order to allow for greater oversight of the arbitral forum to 
police unethical behavior.
20
  These changes included extending criminal 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 12  See, e.g., Zachary Gima et al., Forced Arbitration: Unfair and Everywhere, PUB. CITIZEN 2 (Sept. 14, 
2009), http://www.citizen.org/documents/UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf (describing arbitration as “secret” and 
unfair, particularly to consumers). 
 13  See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1249 
(2009); David Sherwyn, Because it Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail to 
Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 1 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 1, 3 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrations from Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 254 
(2007); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (2005). 
 14  See Stempel, supra note 13, at 254–55.  
 15  See, e.g., Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement: 
What’s Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 401 (1992) (stating that many states 
have precluded enforcement of arbitration agreements in certain contracts). 
 16  See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 13, at 1633 (noting the criticism of arbitration by journalists). 
 17  See, e.g., Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the Same 
Neutral Serves Both as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 317, 333 
(2011) (explaining that parties who employ the same individual as a mediator and arbitrator may be less 
candid during mediation for fear of confidentiality breaches); Kristen M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator 
“Sneeze”?—Do Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction over “Interlocutory” Awards in Class Action 
Arbitrations?, 34 VT. L. REV. 493, 494 (2010) (arguing for judges to not issue interlocutory appeals when 
dealing with arbitrations); Kristen M. Blankley, Class Actions Behind Closed Doors?  How Consumer 
Claims Can (and Should) be Resolved by Class-Action Arbitration, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 451, 
453 (2005) (arguing that arbitrators should hear class action claims); Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. 
Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
1051, 1079 (2009) (finding empirical evidence that arbitration benefits consumers). 
 18  Kristen M. Blankley, Taming the Wild West of Arbitration Ethics, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 925, 932 
(2012) (noting that ethical misconduct in arbitral forums becomes increasingly possible without criminal 
sanctions) [hereinafter Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I]. 
 19  Kristen M. Blankley, Advancements in Arbitral Immunity and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Create 
Ethical Loopholes in Arbitration (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2) [hereinafter Blankley, Arbitration Ethics 
II], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239182.  
 20  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 929; Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 
(manuscript at 3).   
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laws regarding the administration of justice to the arbitral forum
21
 and 
conforming the standard of review for participant fraud to the same 
standard as every other grounds for review under the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).
22
     
Although I still support advocating for these systematic changes at the 
legislative and judicial level, my previous research only scratched the 
surface for another type of ethics enforcement in the arbitral forum—the 
arbitrators themselves.  While not explicit in my previous research, 
arbitrators can and should be the first line of defense in dealing with 
participant misconduct.
23
  In fact, arbitrators are already equipped with the 
tools for enforcing their own tribunals, both by their inherent powers as 
well as by rules of provider organizations.
24
  My previous writings 
mistakenly presumed that arbitrators have and should execute these powers 
to ensure a fair tribunal.
25
  To date, however, no scholarship has examined 
the arbitrator’s ability to regulate and police the conduct of participants, 
especially to correct for ethical shortcomings.  This Article seeks to fill this 
void in the scholarship. 
Placing greater emphasis on the arbitrator’s role as ethics enforcer 
comports with our deeply held notions of due process and fundamental 
fairness—both of which are judicially required of the arbitral tribunal.26  As 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 21  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 948 (“[E]very state should update its law to 
include arbitration within the ambit of these criminal laws.”). 
 22  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 3) (noting that currently, the standard 
for vacatur for “fraud” is unreasonably higher than the standard for vacatur under any other grounds for 
review). 
 23  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926; Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 
(manuscript at 2). 
 24  See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RULES OF ARBITRATION (2012), available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/. 
 25  See, e.g., Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 974–75. 
 26  See, e.g., Tempo Shane Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that an 
arbitral award is subject to vacatur in cases in which the arbitral procedure did not comport with 
fundamental fairness); Star Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, No. 13-13807, 2013 
WL 5182745, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2013) (finding that fundamental fairness was not present in an 
arbitral process in which ex parte communications with arbitrators was happening); Wolf v. Sprenger + 
Lang, P.L.L.C., 70 A.3d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“Misconduct under section 10(a)(3) of the FAA 
usually involves the exclusion of pertinent and material evidence that deprives a party of fundamental 
fairness.”); Senra v. Town of Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 38–40 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing the due process 
rights for an employee in a post-termination arbitration).  In addition, some arbitral providers have their 
own “Due Process Protocols” to govern the proceedings.  The American Arbitration Association, for 
example, has at least three Due Process Protocols for consumer cases, employment cases, and healthcare 
cases.  See generally AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2012), available 
at www.adr.org; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2011), available at 
www.adr.org; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, HEALTHCARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (2011), available at 
2014] Lying, Stealing, and Cheating 447 
 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, the arbitral forum is not a waiver 
of substantive rights, but merely a change in the forum determining whether 
those rights have been violated.
27
  If the arbitral forum is intended to be a 
substitute for the judicial forum, then it must be fair and free from 
misconduct.  Given the lack of institutional controls over the arbitral forum, 
arbitrators appear to be the first and last resort to protect participants and 
ensure a fair forum.  The arbitrator as “ethics enforcer” may be a new and 
uncomfortable role, especially considering that arbitrators are hired by the 
parties and may stand to earn a significant amount of money in present and 
future assignments from the parties.  Despite the potential (and perhaps 
implicit) conflict, due process and fundamental fairness require arbitrators 
to stand above the parties, respond to parties’ concerns, and be vigilant to 
raise concerns sua sponte.  Anything less would jeopardize the integrity of 
arbitration and further erode public confidence in the process.  
This Article will begin in Part II with a short description of the 
expansion of judicial immunity, which is one of the biggest motivating 
reasons for concern for arbitral ethics.  If judicial immunity were not 
extended to the arbitral forum, parties who fall victim to unethical practices 
in the arbitral forum might have recourse.  Immunity for arbitration 
participants, then, creates a pressing need for other reform.  Reform, as 
noted in Part III, could be achieved through changes to the law—
particularly by expanding the criminal laws dealing with crimes against the 
administration of justice to the arbitral forum or ever so slightly loosening 
the standards of vacatur in the event of unethical conduct, or both.  
Recognizing that these legal reforms are unlikely, Part IV of this Article 
examines the arbitrator’s role as the ethics enforcer.  Part V will consider 
the historical role of arbitrators in policing the conduct within their 
tribunals, as well as examine the rules and procedures of the largest 
arbitration provider organizations.  Arbitrators, indeed, should be the first 
line of defense in dealing with allegations of unethical conduct—as well as 
being vigilant themselves during their tribunal.  Realistically speaking, 
arbitrators are the only true ethics enforcers in the arbitral forum, a role that 
they rightly deserve.  Without arbitrators taking on this role, the integrity of 
the arbitration process will be in jeopardy.  This Article concludes by 
acknowledging the role of arbitrator as ethics enforcer while still urging for 
legal change as an ethics “backstop.”     
                                                                                                                           
www.adr.org. 
 27  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (dealing with claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (dealing 
with claims under the Securities Exchange Act). 
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II. HOW ARBITRAL IMMUNITY CHANGES THE ETHICS LANDSCAPE  
Talking about arbitral immunity at the beginning of the discussion feels 
almost counterintuitive because it feels as if the discussion is starting at the 
end.  After all, arbitral immunity is a concept that generally figures into a 
post-arbitration discussion, as opposed to a discussion about unethical 
conduct occurring during an arbitration.  The application of the immunity 
doctrine, however, to arbitration has dramatically changed the ethical 
landscape of the arbitral forum in unexpected ways.  Although the 
extension of the immunity doctrine, described more fully below, rightfully 
should be extended to the arbitral forum, the immunity doctrine frustrates 
any effort to enforce ethical violations made by arbitration participants.  If 
the process cannot be managed in an ethical manner, then arbitration runs 
the risk of being a forum lacking due process controls. 
Essentially, the concept of absolute,
28
 sometimes called “judicial,” 
immunity shields judicial participants (judges, lawyers, witnesses, parties, 
etc.) from later suit based on comments made and actions taken in the 
judicial forum.
29
  The classic application of absolute immunity applies to a 
suit for defamation based on statements made during a judicial 
proceeding.
30
  This “classic” definition of absolute immunity has been 
extended to any number of other tort claims “sounding” in defamation,31 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 28  Note that the concept of absolute immunity also applies in the legislative and other governmental 
forums.  See 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 500 (2010); 56 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal Corporations, 
Etc. § 133 (2010); Charles W. Johnson IV, The Doctrine of Official Immunity: An Unnecessary 
Intrusion into Speech or Debate Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 535, 535 (1994); Jeanine 
M. Pollitt, Legislative Immunity and City Councils: Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625 (1990), 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1049, 1050 (1990). 
 29  See, e.g., Kidd v. Superior Nursing Care, Inc., No. 08-504 (JAP), 2008 WL 2945960, at *2 (D.N.J. 
July 28, 2008) (“A statement made in the course of judicial, administrative, or legislative proceedings is 
absolutely privileged and wholly immune from liability.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Schultea v. City of Patton Vill., H-06-0666, 2006 WL 3063457, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2006) 
(“Statements made in the due course of a quasi-judicial proceeding cannot serve as the basis of a civil 
action for defamation regardless of the negligence or malice with which they were made.”) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 30  See, e.g., Kidd, 2008 WL 2945960, at *2. 
 31  Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, 712 N.W.2d 215, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (“Even if the 
claim is not for defamation, if it sounds in defamation, absolute immunity applies.  The judicial 
immunity rule is not to be ‘scuttled’ by pleadings which allege that the wrongful acts resulted from a 
conspiracy rather than from defamation.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Mahoney & Hagberg court noted that, most often, the defense of absolute immunity arises in the context 
of a defamation claim.  Id.  (“Respondent claims that judicial immunity applies only to defamation 
claims.  Traditionally, judicial immunity has applied to protect participants in the judicial process 
against claims of defamation.  [D]efamatory matter published in the due course of a judicial proceeding 
is absolutely privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation[.]  In Minnesota, nearly all 
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such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, unfair competition, 
conspiracy, and other similar torts.
32
  Living up to the title of “absolute,” 
this immunity applies regardless of the speaker’s intent33 and whether the 
statement is written or oral.
34
  Generally, the only limitations on the 
privilege are (1) that the statement occurs within a protected proceeding 
(such as a court or legislative proceeding), and (2) that the statement is 
pertinent to the claims brought or relief sought.
35
   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, absolute immunity has been applied to the 
arbitral forum.  In many ways, the arbitral forum is similar to the litigation 
forum, with both proceedings involving a neutral, third-party decision-
maker making a binding decision after a presentation of evidence.
36
  The 
few cases dealing directly with this issue have all decided to extend 
immunity to arbitration.  Although the cases are factually different, the 
courts rely on similar reasoning for this application of the law to this new 
territory.
37
  These courts rightly extend the doctrine of immunity to 
arbitration for the following reasons (again, with the caveat that institutional 
controls can ensure that arbitration is a fundamentally fair forum): 
                                                                                                                           
assertions of judicial immunity involve underlying claims for defamation.”)  (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 114, at 
816–17 (5th ed. 1984)). 
 32  See Asset Mgmts. Sys., Inc. v. White, Zuckerman, Warsavsky & Luna, No. B143168, 2002 WL 
724925, at *8–9 (Cal. Ct. App. April 25, 2002) (dismissing all of the causes of action on the basis of 
immunity, including the causes of action for abuse of process and unfair business practice). 
 33  Soliz v. Williams, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“However, the immunity from a suit 
for damages at issue is not dependent on the severity of the misconduct.”).   
 34  Gallegos v. Escalon, 993 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (“All communications, oral or 
written, made in the due course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged.”). 
 35  Harmon v. Bennett, 103 Wash. App. 1045 (2000) (“Allegedly libelous statements, spoken or 
written by a party or counsel in the course of a judicial proceeding, are absolutely privileged if they are 
pertinent or material to the redress or relief sought, whether or not the statements are legally sufficient to 
obtain that relief.”) (citing McNeal v. Allen, 621 P.2d 1285 (Wash. 1980)).  Off-hand comments not 
fitting this definition are not protected.  See Post v. Mendel, 507 A.2d 351, 356 (Pa. 1986) (holding that 
a letter sent by an attorney was not privileged because it was not relevant to the redress or relief sought 
by the client). 
 36  Stephen J. Ware, Similarities Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy Litigation, 11 NEV. L.J. 436, 446–47 
(2011). 
 37  Kidwell v. General Motors Corp., 975 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“[W]e agree 
with the trial court that Nichols had immunity for his alleged wrongful actions because they occurred 
during an arbitration proceeding.”) (involving a dispute over a purchased pickup truck); Bushell v. 
Caterpillar, Inc., 683 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (involving an employment grievance); 
Odyniec v. Schneider, 588 A.2d 786, 793 (Md. 1991) (involving a claim against an expert witness for 
statements made in a medical malpractice arbitration).   
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A. Promotion of Candor Within the Tribunal 
Perhaps the single most important reason for the doctrine of immunity 
is the policy of promoting candor within the tribunal.  In litigation and 
arbitration alike, the third-party neutral must make decisions based on 
evidence presented before the tribunal.
38
  Decision-makers must sort 
through conflicting evidence in order to determine the truth of what 
happened in the past.  The immunity doctrine aids these decision-makers in 
finding the truth by encouraging people to come forth to the tribunal with 
their evidence.
39
  The ability to encourage parties to speak certainly also 
promotes fundamental fairness, especially considering that promoting 
candor helps promote relevant, truthful statements. 
A dispute resolution forum without immunity from suit for statements 
made within it would chill speech.  People would be less willing to come 
forth with their evidence if they potentially faced civil repercussion initiated 
by the other side, simply for appearing in court and giving testimony.
40
  The 
rule, while protecting a certain amount of civil harm done to individuals 
within the fora, encourages speech and helps promote the truth-seeking 
function of the tribunal.
41
  For those claims pursued in the public forums 
(such as court), the criminal laws regarding perjury, tampering, and 
obstruction of justice serve as a valuable backstop to deter wrongdoing and 
prosecute those who engage in criminal conduct injurious to the process.
42
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 38  See 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 8:41 (3d ed. 2012).  Unlike judges, 
arbitrators are strictly bound by the evidence brought before them.  See id.  Arbitrators who conduct their own 
research outside of the parties’ presentations may have their awards subject to vacatur.  See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) 
(2012) (stating that arbitration awards may be vacated for any misbehavior causing prejudice to any party’s 
rights); 1 GRENIG, supra, at § 8:41 (“An arbitrator cannot take any evidence outside of the hearing without the 
parties’ authorization.  It is improper for arbitrators independently to inspect property or to investigate matters 
involved in a dispute unless all of the parties are fully aware of the investigation and agree to it, or unless the rules 
under which the arbitration is being conducted permit it.”).  
 39  See, e.g., Blevins v. Hudson & Keyse, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2004) 
(“[W]itness immunity fosters the truth-finding judicial function within the context of the adversarial 
process.”); Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp., 865 A.2d 1163, 1171 (Conn. 2005) (“Put simply, 
absolute immunity furthers the public policy of encouraging participation and candor in judicial and 
quasi-judicial proceedings.”). 
 40  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D cmt. b (1977). 
 41  See cases cited supra note 39.  
 42  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18 at 928–29.  
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B. Encouraging Parties to Seek Redress 
Applying the judicial privilege also allows parties, particularly 
plaintiffs, to initiate an action without the fear of being sued later for 
bringing that action.
43
  For the judicial system to work, parties must have 
trust in the system, or at least enough trust in the system to not resort to 
vigilante justice.
44
  Bestowing judicial privilege on participants gives them 
the security and protection that they need to resort to the usual channels of 
justice for dispute resolution.
45
  Judicial privilege also protects those who 
have questionable claims to allow them to bring them up for resolution 
without fear of future lawsuits based on the bringing of the claim.
46
  
Advocates, too, are protected by the judicial privilege, giving them 
flexibility in their lawyering styles.
47
  
Without the privilege, disputants would be less likely to seek redress in 
the proper channels and more likely to resort to self-help or vigilante 
justice.  Providing a forum for the orderly resolution of disputes is a 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 43  See, e.g., Harvey v. Montgomery Cty., Tex., No. 11-CV-1815, 2012 WL 12530, at *6 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 3, 2012) (“Policy interests justifying immunity include the fact that the fear of suit may cause the 
prosecutor to ‘shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his 
public trust.’”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Ims v. Town of Portsmouth, 32 
A.3d 914, 928 (R.I. 2011) (“The doctrine of absolute privilege exists because it is more important that 
witnesses be free from the fear of civil liability for what they say than that a person who has been 
defamed by their testimony have a remedy.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 44  See, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment 
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 87 (2012) (noting that in today’s modern system, we have 
a police force that will keep law and order and eliminate the need for vigilante justice); C. Crystal 
Enekwa, Comment, Capital Punishment and the Marshall Hypothesis: Reforming a Broken System of 
Punishment, 80 TENN. L. REV. 411, 445 (2013) (describing one rationale for the death penalty is to serve 
a retributive ends and keep people from resorting to vigilante justice). 
 45  See Ims, 32 A.3d at 928. 
 46  See Lambert v. Carneghi, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  Of course, some civil 
penalties may result from certain abuses of the litigation process: Attorneys who violate Rule 11, for 
example, may be subject to sanctions, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11, and parties who engage in certain abuses 
could be liable for the tort of abuse of process, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977), or 
violate a statute prohibiting frivolous conduct, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2013) 
(granting trial courts discretion to order party or attorney responsible for frivolous actions or delays to 
pay expenses); N.H. R. SUPER. CT. R. 59 (granting court authority to assess costs and fees against party 
responsible for frivolous or unreasonable conduct).  
 47  Ronald S. Canter & Manuel H. Newburger, Common Law Immunity for Litigation Activities 
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 61 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 29, 39 (2007) (discussing 
the importance of attorneys exercising sound legal perspective as part of their duty as officers of the 
court and needing immunity from attempting to help clients achieve representation for their colorable 
legal claims); Monica R. Nuckolls, Torts, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 439, 465 (2008) (noting that absolute 
privilege exists “to promote the public policy ‘of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the 
upmost freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients’”) (citation omitted).     
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laudable goal underlying our entire legal system, including the system of 
arbitration.  Again, the privilege would protect a certain amount of 
wrongful, hurtful, and damaging conduct, but the protections offered by the 
privilege far outweigh the potential harm.  Provided that the criminal law is 
available to serve as both a deterrent and a backstop for wrongful conduct, 
the privilege serves the important policy of encouraging dispute resolution 
in proper channels. 
C. Preventing Endless Satellite Litigation  
If judicial privilege did not exist, then one lawsuit could generate 
multiple lawsuits sounding in defamation just based on the claims in the 
original lawsuit alone.  Without judicial privilege, the winning party in a 
lawsuit could file a new suit against the losing party for making the 
allegedly “false” statements during the prior lawsuit.48  Unchecked, this 
type of litigation would spin on into infinity, potentially resulting in 
inconsistent findings, offsetting obligations, and other complications over 
the course of generations.  Immunity, therefore, helps relieve the courts 
from a burgeoning docket and protects the finality of judgments.
49
  
These three policy reasons for immunity—promoting testimony, 
encouraging the redress of wrongs, and preventing satellite litigation—all 
apply equally to arbitration.  Arbitrators need to hear evidence and 
determine the truth of the past.
50
  Participants, including representatives, 
should be free to present evidence without civil liability, and the awards of 
arbitrators should be considered final.
51
   
Of course, one could argue that given the nonpublic nature of 
arbitration, the harm caused by actions otherwise amounting to 
“defamation” would arguably be less.  In a public proceeding, the harm 
caused by the statements made in the forum could have wide-reaching and 
very public effects.  If the harm is less, then, immunity would not be 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 48  Surace v. Wulinger, 495 N.E.2d 939, 944 (Ohio 1986) (noting that without privilege, court dockets 
would be burdened by lawsuits based upon statements made in other proceedings).   
 49  Id.; see also Lambert, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 644 (noting that privilege serves to “promote finality of 
judgments by discouraging endless collateral litigation.”).  Perhaps contract law could protect arbitral 
participants from engaging in this type of behavior if the parties were to agree that the arbitrator’s 
decision would be final, binding, and not subject to any type of review or other lawsuit.  Whether this 
type of agreement would be valid, however, is questionable, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), which put limitations on 
the parties’ ability to expand judicial review. 
 50  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 929. 
 51  See discussion supra Part II.A–C; discussion infra Part II.D.   
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needed.  Immunity however, does not serve to curb the harm of an alleged 
defamatory statement.  Immunity is counterintuitive—it allows some types 
of bad behavior in order to best preserve other important virtues.  These 
virtues are similarly important in arbitration, whether the magnitude of the 
harm is the same.  Some additional policies underlying the privilege 
particularly serve the arbitral forum.  These next sections discuss those 
interests. 
D. Finality in Arbitration  
One of the primary reasons that parties choose arbitration is to have a 
dispute resolution process that ensures a final and binding decision.  
Finality is achieved primarily through the limited review provided to parties 
in the FAA.
52
  Under the FAA, an arbitration award can only be overturned 
in the most limited of circumstances, including (1) “corruption, fraud, or 
undue means,” (2) “evident partiality” of the neutral, (3) arbitrator 
procedural “misconduct,” or (4) arbitrators “exceed[ing] their powers.”53  
Congress established this limited review to ensure finality of awards.
54
  
These grounds are extraordinarily difficult to meet, and a small number of 
awards are overturned by the courts on an annual basis.
55
 
Given the fact that finality is already an important virtue in arbitration,
56
 
extending absolute immunity to the arbitral context makes perfect sense.  
Immunity serves to protect the finality of judgments.
57
  Finality is a key 
tenet of arbitration,
58
 so extending judicial immunity to the arbitral forum 
fulfills these important policy objectives.
59
 
E. Decision-Making on a Limited Record  
To promote arbitration’s efficiencies in terms of time and money, many 
participants rightfully truncate prehearing discovery when they participate 
in arbitration.  Although traditional discovery, including depositions and 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 52  See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). 
 53  Id.   
 54  See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).  
 55  See Julia A. Martin, Note, Arbitrating in the Alps Rather Than Litigating in Los Angeles: The 
Advantages of International Intellectual Property-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 49 STAN. L. REV. 917, 
947 n.237 (1997) (noting, at the time, that less than 10% of arbitral awards are overturned each year). 
 56  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 931. 
 57  Lambert v. Carneghi, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 626, 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).    
 58  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  
 59  See discussion supra Part II.A–D. 
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document requests, often occurs prior to an arbitral hearing, often, the 
parties engage in less formal discovery to adhere to tighter hearing 
deadlines.
60
  By limiting discovery in this manner, parties have the potential 
to save considerable time and money compared to traditional litigation.
61
 
If, however, the parties only engage in limited discovery prior to the 
hearing, the parties go into the hearing with a less developed record and a 
greater potential for “surprises.”62  Given the limited record, the arbitrator’s 
assessment of credibility becomes even more important than in civil 
litigation.  Unlike civil litigation, the parties may not have prior deposition 
testimony or other evidence to demonstrate inconsistent statements.
63
  The 
arbitrator, then, might rely more heavily on demeanor and body language to 
determine the credibility of the witnesses.  Given the greater truth-
determining function of the neutral in arbitration, absolute immunity, then, 
encourages parties to put forth evidence and other testimony without fear of 
reprisal, allowing the arbitrators to do their job.   
F. Summary Conclusion 
The expansion of immunity to the arbitral forum not only promotes the 
original policy goals for the privilege but also promotes many of 
arbitration’s central tenets, such as finality and truth-seeking.  Indeed, the 
doctrine of immunity also promotes some aspects of fairness, namely the 
goals of truth-telling and encouraging the redress of wrongs. 
Others might argue that absolute immunity is less necessary in 
arbitration given that the harm is less (private dispute resolution vs. public 
dispute resolution) and that allowing private suits for defamation would be 
the best way to deal with misconduct in the forum.  Allowing judicial 
recourse for arbitral wrongs, however, would turn a private dispute 
resolution process into a public one, as well as undermine the finality of the 
process.  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 60  Edna Sussman & Victoria A. Kummer, Drafting the Arbitration Clause: A Primer on the Opportunities 
and Pitfalls, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.–Apr. 2012, at 30, 35 (explaining that arbitration is intended to be a “swift and 
efficient alternative dispute resolution process,” and a truncated discovery period helps promote these 
efficiencies);  see also Judy Rost et al., Comparative International Perspectives of Arbitration in the Franchising 
Context, 31 FRANCHISE L.J. 124, 127 (2012) (noting that discovery can be expensive in U.S. litigation and that 
the arbitration procedure is intended to cut down on much of that cost).     
 61  See Rost et al., supra note 60, at 127. 
 62  See Sussman & Kummer, supra note 60, at 35 (“Before [measures to limit discovery] are added to the 
arbitration agreement, care must be taken to think through the nature, size, and complexity of the likely disputes 
and determine the procedures necessary to obtain a fair result.”). 
 63  See 29 C.F.R. § 4221.5(a) (2013) (noting that arbitration hearings under this regulation are conducted in 
the same manner as an arbitration hearing under Title 9 of the United States Code). 
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The provision of immunity to the arbitral forum, however, shields the 
participants from litigation for wrongdoing in the forum.  If no enforcement 
mechanism exists for righting “wrongdoing,” then the arbitral forum has the 
potential to breed unethical behavior.  Due to confidentiality associated 
with the forum and the limited amount of review, unethical behavior in 
arbitration could go unchecked.  In the litigation forum, this type of 
misconduct is remedied through the use of the criminal law.  As the next 
Part outlines, the rules regarding perjury and tampering do not apply to the 
arbitral forum (or at least, not without some creative lawyering), thus 
leaving arbitration as a forum in which wrongs cannot be corrected or 
righted, leaving arbitration in a precarious ethical position.  
III. HOW THE CRIMINAL LAW FAILS TO REACH ARBITRATION 
The criminal laws play an important function in the American justice 
system.  Witnesses must swear under oath and “penalty of perjury” before 
providing testimony, and the criminal law further criminalizes the 
destruction of evidence and tampering with witnesses.
64
  These criminal 
laws provide a basis for prosecution for wrongdoing and, more importantly, 
provide a valuable deterrent to keep people from engaging in bad behaviors 
in the litigation process.
65
  These criminal laws, then, provide a backstop to 
ensure that the litigation process is fair. 
Unfortunately, these criminal laws often do not apply directly to arbitral 
proceedings.  Although creative lawyers can argue that the criminal law 
might apply to arbitration,
66
 none of them apply explicitly to arbitration.
67
  
This Part demonstrates the gap in the criminal law in this area, concluding 
that fundamental fairness requires that the criminal law apply in arbitration. 
A. Perjury  
Perjury is injurious to any system that engages in the administration of 
justice.  Lying undermines the administration of justice and puts the truthful 
parties at a disadvantage.  In addition, public confidence in dispute 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 64  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 933. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Often, the statutes dealing with perjury and tampering are found in a section of the criminal code 
dealing with “Offenses Against Public Administration.”  See MODEL PENAL CODE arts. 240–43 (1962).  
This terminology stems from the Model Penal Code, which organized these laws under that title.  See id.   
 67  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 933. 
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resolution decreases if the process does not have procedural safeguards.
68
  
Lying in arbitration would presumably be just as injurious to the 
administration of justice in arbitration as it is in the public system of 
litigation.  The perjury laws, however, do not explicitly apply to the arbitral 
forum.
69
  
Many states’ definitions of perjury include a requirement that the lying 
occur under oath in an “official proceeding.”70  Often, the definition of 
“official proceeding” only extends to “legislative, judicial, administrative or 
other governmental agency” proceedings.71  States that use this definition of 
“official proceeding” include: Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,  
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, 
and Washington.
72
  These statutes are ambiguous, at best, as to whether they 
apply in arbitration.  Another handful of states prohibit lying under oath 
more generally.  These states include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
and Virginia.
73
  These types of definitions are more likely to apply to 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 68  Mark Curriden, The Lies Have It, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 68, 69 (quoting former ABA Section 
of Litigation chair David Weiner); see also John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui Tam Action for 
Perjury in a Civil Proceeding is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Judicial System, 79 
TEMP. L. REV. 773, 784 (2006) (“While this reluctance to criminally prosecute perjury in civil cases may 
be understandable, it is regrettable because perjury undermines the real and perceived legitimacy of the 
civil judicial system.”) (citation omitted).    
 69  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 933. 
 70  See sources cited infra note 72.  
 71  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 240.0(4). 
 72  ALA. CODE §§ 13A-10-100, -101 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-8-501, -502 (2010); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-146, -156 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 837.02 (2010); HAWAII. REV. STAT. §§ 710-1000, -
1060 (2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-3(a) (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5903(a)(1) (2010); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 523.010(3), .020 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A §§ 451(1), 451(5) (2010); 
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 492.040, 575.010 (2010);  MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-201 (2010);  NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 28-915(1), -916 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641:1 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-25-1, 30-1-
12(G) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-11-01 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2921.01(D), -.11(A) 
(West 2010); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4902 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-501(1), -502 (West 
2010); WASH REV. CODE §§ 9A.72.010(4), -.020 (2010).       
 73  ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.200 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-2-103 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 
118 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1224 (2010); D.C. CODE § 22-2402(a) (2010); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-5401 (2010); IND. CODE § 35-44.1-2-1 (a)(1) (2010); IOWA CODE  § 720.2 (2010); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. LAW§ 9-101(a) (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.423 (2010); MINN. STAT. § 
609.48(1) (2010);  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-59 (2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.15 (McKinney 2010); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 491 (2010); ORE. REV. STAT. § 162. 065(1) (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-33-1(a) 
(2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-30 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-29-1 (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
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arbitration.  Wisconsin and New Jersey extend the perjury laws to 
arbitration,
74
 while a minority of jurisdictions have an extraordinarily 
narrow definition of “official proceedings.”75 
Although creative lawyers could certainly argue that the definitions of 
perjury extend to arbitration, a simple change in the law would make this 
question infinitely clearer.  Without a change in the law, however, 
arbitrators must be keenly aware of the possibility of untruthful testimony 
and dealing with that testimony in the ways discussed below.  Without any 
enforcement mechanism, arbitral awards based on untruthful testimony 
would deny participants fundamental fairness and due process. 
B. Tampering  
Just as with the perjury laws, the tampering laws do not explicitly 
extend to the arbitral forum.  Most tampering laws only apply in an “official 
proceeding,” and that definition likely does not explicitly extend to the 
arbitral forum.  The states utilizing a definition of tampering that includes 
the “official proceeding” term include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and 
                                                                                                                           
39-16-702(a)(1) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.02(a) (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 
(2010).     
 74  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1(a) (West 2010); WIS. STAT.  § 946.31(d) (2010) . 
 75  18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-70(a) (2010) (judicial proceedings only); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:123 (2010) (judicial or legislative proceedings); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, 
§ 1 (West 2010) (court proceedings); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.120 (2010) (when oath required by law); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (2010) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2901 (2010) (court and agency 
proceedings); W. VA. CODE § 61-5-1(a) (2010) (court proceedings); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-5-301(a) 
(2010). 
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Washington.
76
  In addition, and unlike the perjury laws, a handful of states 
recognize a civil cause of action for tampering.
77
 
Because these laws do not explicitly apply to arbitration, open 
questions exist as to whether they are applicable in the arbitral forum at all.  
While arbitrators can, and should, be mindful of the potential for 
misbehavior in their own tribunals, no outside law requires witnesses and 
parties to act in an ethical manner.
78
  Arbitrators who must make decisions 
on limited records because of missing documents may skew the awards in 
the wrongdoer, which seriously prejudices the victim party and leads to 
unfairness in the forum.  Certainly, the criminal law needs to catch up with 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 76  ALA. CODE § 13A-10-129 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-2809 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-111 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-610 (2010); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-155 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §1274 (2010); D.C. Code § 22-723 (2010); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1076 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-2603 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 524.100 (West 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.483a(5) (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-125 
(2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-207 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-922 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 641:6 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28:6 (West 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-03 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12 (West 2010); OKLA 
.STAT.tit. 21, § 454 (2010); ORE. REV. STAT. § 162.295 (2010); 18 PA. STAT. ANN. §  4910 (West 2010); 
S.D. CODIFIIED LAWS § 19-7-14 (2010) (using the term “proceeding,” not “official proceeding”); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-16-503 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
8-510.5 (West 2010) (including a catchall provision of “examination under oath”); WASH. REV. CODE  
§ 9A.72.150 (2010). 
 77  See Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 6 P.3d 300, 303 (Alaska 2000) (recognizing that the 
tort of intentional spoliation of evidence exists under state law); Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 
A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1998) (establishing tort); Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ill. 2004) 
(establishing tort); Desselle v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 887 So. 2d 524, 534 (La. Ct. App. 
2004) (recognizing a tort of intentional spoliation); Manorcare Health Servs. v. Osmose Wood 
Preserving, 764 A.2d 475, 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (noting that destruction of evidence 
could result in a separate tort for spoliation, discovery sanctions, or an adverse inference); DiDomenico 
v. C & S Aeromatik Supplies, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 452, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (noting availability of 
tort); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., Inc., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993) (recognizing tort); 
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 568, 571 (W. Va. 2003) (recognizing tort). Some states expressly 
reject this tort.  See Tobel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 988 P.2d 148, 156 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); Cedars-Sinai 
Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998); Lucas v. Christiana Skating Ctr., Ltd., 722 
A.2d 1247, 1250 (Del. 1998); Owens v. Am. Refuse. Sys., Inc., 536 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000); Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Ky. 1997); Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 
773 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Mass. 2002); Panich v. Iron Wood Prods. Corp., 445 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1989); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 436–37 
(Minn. 1990); Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore, 831 So. 2d 1124, 1135 (Miss. 2002); Patel v. OMH 
Med. Ctr., Inc., 987 P.2d 1185, 1202 (Okla. 1999); Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 67–68 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. 1998); Estate of Neumann v. 
Neumann, 626 N.W.2d 821, 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). 
 78  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, 926.  
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modern arbitration practice,
79
 and until that happens, arbitrators must be the 
first line of defense to ensure a fair forum.
80
  
C. Advancements in the Area of Legal Ethics  
Although the criminal law has not yet caught up to modern arbitration 
practice, the world of legal ethics has.  Updates to the codes of legal ethics 
have implemented the change noted above by simply adding the term 
“arbitration” to the list of forums covered by the rules.81  While the criminal 
law focuses on the term “official proceeding,” the legal ethics rules discuss 
conduct before a “tribunal,” and since 2002, “tribunal” includes the arbitral 
forum.
82
  When a lawyer practices before a “tribunal,” the lawyer may not 
make a “false statement of fact or law” or “offer evidence that the lawyer 
knows to be false.”83  Further, the ethics rules prohibit attorneys from 
tampering, concealing, or obstructing another party’s access to evidence—
whether this evidence be used in a tribunal or not.
84
   
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 79  See id. at 933.  
 80  See Steven C. Bennett, Who Is Responsible for Ethical Behavior by Counsel in Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. 
J., May–July 2008, at 38, 42. 
 81  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(m) (2012) (“‘Tribunal’ denotes a court, an arbitrator 
in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in 
an adjudicative capacity.  A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative 
capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or 
parties, will render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular 
matter.”). 
 82  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926 n.4. 
 83  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2012).  The following states adopted this, or a 
substantially similar rule (found in Rule 3.3 of the respective state’s model rules, unless otherwise 
noted): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida (R. 4-3.3), Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa (R. 32:3.3), Kansas, Kentucky (KY. 
SUP. CT. R. 3.130(3.3)), Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri (R. 4-3.3), Montana, Nebraska (R. 3-503.3), Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico (R. 16-303), New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas (R. 3.03), Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (2000).   
 84  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2012); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117 (2000).  The following states adopted a version of Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.4 dealing with candor toward opposing counsel and parties (labeled as Rule 3.4, 
unless otherwise noted): Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida (R. 4-3.4), Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,  Illinois, Indiana, Iowa (R. 32:3.4), 
Kansas, Kentucky (Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130(3.4)), Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,  
Mississippi, Missouri (R. 4-3.4), Montana, Nebraska (R. 3-503.4), Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico (R. 16-304), New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas (R. 3.04), Utah, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.    
460 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:443 
 
Clearly, legal ethics have caught up with modern alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) practice, and the drafters of Ethics 2000 should be 
commended for this realization.  Despite this advancement, legal ethics 
rules are only a small piece of the puzzle.  These rules only apply to 
lawyers, not other participants,
85
 and the remedies are usually limited to 
disciplinary measures against the attorney.
86
  While lawyers should be 
counted on to act in an ethical manner, they do not always do so.
87
  Small 
changes to the criminal law would do a lot to fill the gap in the law.  
 
IV. THE HIGH BURDEN OF PROOF ADDS TO THE ETHICAL QUANDARY 
 
Adding to the ethical questions posed by the application of the criminal 
law to arbitration is the fact that the burden of proof for the ethical 
wrongdoings of participants is unwarrantedly more stringent than for any 
other type of judicial review for arbitration awards.  While I have 
previously argued that this review is not supported by policy,
88
 arbitrators 
must keep this fact in mind when considering what to do with unethical 
behavior in the forum.
89
  If arbitrators better understand the lack of recourse 
available for these types of participant infractions, hopefully they will be 
more inclined to deal with these problems in the first instance.
90
  
As a general matter, the law rightfully limits the ability to challenge an 
arbitration award.
91
  Limited judicial review discourages post-award 
challenges and helps promote finality.
92
  Across the country, less than one 
in five awards are ever vacated, further discouraging parties from seeking 
vacatur.
93
  An award can only be vacated under the most limited 
circumstances.  Those grounds include: (1) when the award is procured by 
“corruption, fraud, or undue means,” (2) the arbitrators are biased, (3) the 
arbitrator engages in procedural misconduct, or (4) the arbitrators exceed 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 85  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926 n.4. 
 86  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope cmt. 20 (2012). 
 87  See, e.g., In re David, 690 S.E.2d 579, 581–82 (S.C. 2010); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against 
Carmick, 48 P.3d 311, 323 (Wash. 2002); In re Jordan, 623 N.E.2d 1372, 1375 (Ill. 1993). 
 88  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 39–40).  
 89  See Bennett, supra note 80, at 40. 
 90  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926 n.4 (noting Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct apply only to attorneys, not other arbitration participants). 
 91  See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012). 
 92  See Plymouth-Carver Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Mass. 1990) 
(“The policy of limited judicial review is reflective of the strong public policy favoring arbitration as an 
expeditious alternative to litigation for setting commercial disputes.”). 
 93  Lawrence R. Mills et al., Vacating Arbitration Awards, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 23, 24. 
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their powers.
94  
These statutory grounds largely consider procedural 
irregularities, as opposed to the correctness of the decision.
95
  Section 
10(a)(1) is the only grounds for review based on misconduct on the part of 
someone other than the arbitrator.
96
  In addition, some jurisdictions 
recognize two additional grounds for review, which are when an arbitrator’s 
award evidences a “manifest disregard of the law” or is “contrary to public 
policy,” although the continuing validity of these judicially-created grounds 
for review is uncertain given recent Supreme Court precedents.
97
  These 
two grounds also deal exclusively with arbitrator conduct (i.e., decision-
making).
98
  
For the most part, district courts review the cases de novo to determine 
whether the grounds for vacatur exist.
99
  This is true for every standard of 
review other than § 10(a)(1), which deals with participant misconduct.
100
  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 94  9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
 95  See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 
1116 (2009). 
 96  See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). 
 97  Over the past few years, the Supreme Court has given indications that only the four enumerated 
grounds for review listed in § 10(a) of the FAA can be used to vacate an arbitration award, and not these 
judicially created grounds.  In Hall Street Associates, L.L.C., v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), the 
Supreme Court held that parties could not contract for a standard of review greater than that prescribed 
in § 10(a).  See id. at 590.  The Court left open the possibility that courts could review an award based 
on standards other than those in the statute.  See id.  The Court acknowledged, but did not resolve this 
issue again in Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S.. 662 (2010).  See id. at 
672 & n.3.  For the purposes of this Chapter, whether these grounds exist is immaterial because these 
grounds of review deal with an arbitrator’s award, as opposed to the conduct of an opposing party or 
witness.  See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
  In the 2012 decision of Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012), the 
United States Supreme Court reversed a decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court invalidating 
certain nursing home contracts as violative of public policy.  Id. at 1202.  While never stating that the 
public policy exception does not exist, the Court struck down the West Virginia decision as preempted 
by the Federal Arbitration Act—thus leaving in doubt whether any public policy exception based on 
state law would not be preempted.  See id. at 1204. 
 98  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 41–42) (“[T]hese two additional 
grounds delve deeper into the arbitrator’s decision-making power.”). 
 99  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 980. 
 100  See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671–72 (discussing § 10(a)(4) without ever discussing a higher 
burden of proof); Rame, L.L.C. v. Popovich, 878 F. Supp. 2d 439, 443–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing the 
narrowness of the “manifest disregard” grounds of review without discussing a higher burden of proof); Crozer-
Chester Med. Ctr. v. Crozer-Chester Nurses Assoc., No. 11-7300, 2012 WL 2500930, at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 
2012) (applying a de novo standard to determine if the case fell within the narrow review); Ardalan v. Macy’s 
Inc., No. 5:09-cv-04894 JW, 2012 WL 2503972, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (utilizing a higher burden of 
proof under § 10(a)(1) than under § 10(a)(2) for evident partiality); Urban Assocs., Inc. v. Standex Elecs, Inc., 
No. 4:04-CV-40059, 2012 WL 1079723, at *8–11 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2012) (applying de novo standard of 
review under § 10(a)(2)); MPJ v. Aero Sky, L.L.C., 673 F. Supp. 2d 475, 484–86 (2009) (applying a higher 
burden of proof under § 10(a)(1) than under § 10(a)(3)); In re Arbitration Before the N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc., 
No. 04 Civ. 488(RWS), 2004 WL 2072460, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004) (applying a de novo standard 
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For cases dealing with participant misconduct, the case law has developed a 
significantly higher standard of proof, in addition to the narrow grounds for 
vacatur.
101
 
Under § 10(a)(1), an arbitration award can be vacated if the moving 
party can establish “corruption, fraud, or undue means” on the part of any 
arbitration participant—i.e., the section is not limited to arbitrators.102  
These are the only grounds for review available to challenge an award on 
the basis of participant conduct other than the arbitrator.
103
  As the federal 
common law developed under § 10(a)(1), the courts added a requirement 
that the standard be met by “clear and convincing evidence.”104  More than 
likely, this higher evidentiary burden stems from the fact that to prove a 
cause of action for fraud requires a burden of “clear and convincing” 
evidence.
105
  This heightened burden, however, is completely unwarranted 
because the parties are seeking no greater relief than vacatur under any 
other section.
106
  Unlike a cause of action for fraud, the parties cannot get 
civil damages—or punitive damages—on a motion for vacatur based on 
fraud.
107
 
As noted in my previous scholarship, removing the heightened burden 
would best comport with the interests of justice and due process.
108
  Being a 
realist, however, I recognize that the courts are unlikely to change their 
judicially-created tests.  Given these significant ethical questions, this paper 
recommends that arbitrators take a more active role as the ethics enforcers 
within their own forum, even when this requirement is uncomfortable or 
jeopardizes an arbitrator’s future employment as a paid neutral. 
                                                                                                                           
under § 10(a)(3)). 
 101  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 932. 
 102  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (2012). 
 103  See id. § 10(a)(1). 
 104  Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 
1986) (vacating only if the alleged “fraud”  was (1) not discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence prior to 
the arbitration, (2) materially related to an issue in the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and convincing 
evidence); see also Smith West, L.L.C. v. Mohnach Payne Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 09-0568, 2010 WL 2471051, at 
*2 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 17, 2010) (“[A] party seeking to vacate an arbitration award claiming fraud must show 
‘that the fraud was (1) not discoverable upon the exercise of due diligence prior to the arbitration, (2) materially 
related to an issue in the arbitration, and (3) established by clear and convincing evidence.’”) (citing Lafarge 
Conseils Et Etudes, S.A., 791 F.2d at 1339).  This test appears to be the test that a majority of the courts employ 
when confronted with a motion for vacatur on the grounds of fraud while other tests are employed in a minority 
of jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Prof'l Builders, Inc. v. Sedan Floral, Inc., 819 P.2d 1254, 1258 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) 
(“‘As a general rule any fraud or misconduct having a tendency to affect the award improperly will vitiate it and 
render it subject to impeachment.’”) (quoting 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 202 (2013)).  
 105  See, e.g., Flora v. Kingsbridge Homes, 625 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (requiring “clear 
and convincing evidence” to “state a cause of action for fraud”). 
 106  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 981–82. 
 107  See id. at 982. 
 108  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 63–64).  
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V. ARBITRATORS AS ETHICS ENFORCERS 
Arbitrators, as hearing presiders, are the natural first line of defense for 
dealing with unethical conduct within their own forum.  Given the 
uncertainty of the applicability of the criminal law
109
 and the extraordinarily 
high burden for vacatur,
110
 the arbitrator stands at the perfect position for 
dealing with ethics abuses.  The role of ethics enforcer may be not only 
unfamiliar for arbitrators but also uncomfortable.  Arbitrators who are party 
chosen and party paid, may be less likely to find unethical conduct for a 
whole host of reasons, including a belief that the people who hired them are 
“good” attorneys, a fear (legitimate or not) of fewer future referrals, and a 
fear (legitimate or not) of disappointing the same people who hired 
them.  In order to provide a fair forum, however, an arbitrator needs to be 
vigilant and responsive to unethical conduct in the forum.  
This Part considers three primary reasons why arbitrators should be 
acting as ethics enforcers.  First, arbitrators have always been put in this 
role, whether or not they would have called themselves “ethics 
enforcers.”111  Second, arbitrators are in the best position to handle these 
types of issues, either on motion or sua sponte, because they are closest to 
the issue and can better assess participant credibility.
112
  Third, arbitrators 
have a myriad of tools available at their disposal to deal with participant 
misconduct that other venues do not have.
113
  This Part considers these three 
areas in greater detail. 
A. Historically, Arbitrators Acted in This Role 
As a historical matter, the law and the courts have been relatively 
“hands off” regarding arbitration issues.  This treatment is unsurprising 
given that the primary purpose of arbitration is to provide an alternative 
forum to resolve disputes.  With no one assuming the role of overseeing 
arbitration, arbitrators must be responsible for managing their own tribunal 
and correcting wrongdoing within the forum.
114
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 109  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 926. 
 110  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671 (2010) (“Petitioners contend that the 
decision of the arbitration panel must be vacated, but in order to obtain that relief, they must clear a high 
hurdle.”). 
 111  See infra Part V.A. 
 112  See infra Part V.B. 
 113  See infra Part V.B. 
 114  Bennett, supra note 80, at 42. 
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1. Federal Law Provides Little Guidance on Arbitration 
The laws governing arbitration are extraordinarily sparse.  The FAA for 
instance, contains a mere sixteen provisions and that have remained largely 
unchanged since 1925.
115
  The FAA, for the most part, does not deal with 
the actions of the arbitrator within the tribunal.
116
  The first four provisions 
of the FAA deal with the “front end” of arbitration law—or how a case gets 
into arbitration.
117
  These first four sections make agreements to arbitrate 
enforceable by specific performance,
118
 provide for a stay of litigation filed 
in the federal district courts in lieu of arbitration,
119
 and allow courts to 
issue orders compelling the parties to arbitrate.
120
  Four of the last 
provisions of the FAA deal with “back end” issues relating to the 
confirmation and vacatur of arbitral awards.
121
  As discussed above,
122
 
arbitration awards must be confirmed by a court, unless they are vacated or 
modified under the narrow grounds provided by the FAA.
123
 
With respect to what actually occurs in arbitration, the FAA is 
amazingly silent.  The FAA provides that a court can appoint an arbitrator if 
the parties are unable to do so.
124
  In addition, the FAA gives arbitrators a 
subpoena power that allows them to compel the presence of witnesses and 
the production of documents for use in an arbitration hearing.
125
  These two 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 115  As originally enacted, the FAA contained fourteen provisions.  Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified 
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)).  In 1970, Congress enacted Chapter Two of the FAA to deal with the 
enforceability of international arbitration awards.  Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–208 (2012)).  Chapter Two, however, does not deal with domestic arbitration or with the workings of the 
arbitral tribunal at all.  See id.  
 116  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 117  See id. §§ 1–4.  
 118  Id. § 2 (“A written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract.”) (emphasis added). 
 119  Id. § 3 (“If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any 
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing . . . , the court in which such suit is pending, . 
. . shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had 
in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .”). 
 120  Id. § 4 (“[T]he court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.”). 
 121  See id. §§ 9–12.  
 122  Id. § 9.  
 123  Id. §§ 9–11.  
 124  Id. § 5 (allowing a court to appoint an arbitrator if the parties’ own selection method does not 
result in the appointment of an arbitrator or if other reasons exist as to why the parties cannot determine 
on their own who will arbitrate their dispute). 
 125  Id. § 7 (providing subpoena power). 
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provisions are the only provisions dealing with the hearing itself (and even 
including § 5 on the appointment of arbitrators is somewhat of a stretch).
126
  
Otherwise, the FAA is silent on how an arbitrator should conduct an 
arbitration hearing.
127
 
Notably, the FAA says absolutely nothing about arbitration procedure 
or evidentiary burdens.  The FAA contains no provisions regarding 
discovery, besides those noted above regarding subpoenaing persons and 
documents.
128
  Thus, the FAA gives the arbitrators little guidance on issues 
such as prehearing exchanges of documents between the parties, 
depositions, and interrogatories.
129
  In addition, the FAA is silent on the 
issue of what constitutes admissible evidence.
130
  The only guidance that 
arbitrators have stems from FAA § 10, dealing with vacatur.
131
  Under § 
10(a)(3), an arbitration award may be subject to vacatur if the arbitrator 
refuses to consider evidence that is “pertinent and material to the 
controversy.”132  With this guidance arbitrators are likely to admit all 
evidence to help insulate the decision from vacatur.
133
  Citing this section, 
arbitrators often admit all evidence—with the caveat—“for what it’s 
worth.”134  If a close question exists with respect to allegedly fraudulent 
evidence or perjured testimony, the unfortunate outcome is that the 
evidence will likely be admitted “for what it’s worth,” with the hope that 
the arbitrator would later determine that the evidence actually is not of any 
probative value.  Clearly, though, the pressure felt on arbitrators to admit 
evidence could have the effect of making the forum even less fair, 
especially if the arbitrators are not vigilant in determining the veracity of 
witnesses and the genuineness of documents. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 126  See id. §§ 1–16. 
 127  See id. 
 128  See id.  Admittedly, the FAA was enacted prior to our modern rules of procedure, which were 
first enacted in 1938.  Jay S. Goodman, On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 351–52 (1987).  The current 
system of full discovery before trial was certainly not the norm at the time of the FAA’s passage.  See id. 
 129  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.  
 130  See id. § 7 (discussing only the materiality of evidence). 
 131  See id. § 10. 
 132  Id. § 10(a)(3).  
 133  See id. § 10. 
 134  See, e.g., Bernstein v. On-Line Software Int’l, Inc., 648 N.Y.S.2d 602, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); 1 
GRENIG, supra note 38, § 8:61; Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Tammy M. Westhoff, “I’ll Take It for What It Is Worth”—
The Use of Hearsay Evidence by Labor Arbitrators: A Primer and Modest Proposal, 1998 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 
(1998); Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in Employment Disputes, 11 
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 266 (1993).  
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The FAA does not impose any types of evidentiary burdens of proof or 
any requirement that the arbitrators follow the law.
135
  Arbitration is known 
as a tribunal of equity, and the arbitrator’s flexibility in applying the law or 
the business custom has long been a reason why parties choose 
arbitration.
136
  Unfortunately, this flexibility, if unchecked, could create a 
forum that is hospitable to ethics abuses. 
Just as the FAA fails to address issues regarding procedure and 
evidentiary burdens, the FAA is also largely silent on the issue of wrongful 
conduct within the forum.  The only hint of federal law dealing with 
unethical conduct can be found in the review provision, § 10(a)(1), 
discussed above,
137
 that allows vacatur of an arbitral award for “corruption, 
fraud, or undue means”138 committed by an arbitration participant.  
Arbitrator misconduct is also grounds for vacatur.
139
  The FAA does not 
define “corruption,” “fraud,” or “undue means,” or give any guidance as to 
how these matters should be handled before or during the arbitration.
140
 
The FAA’s silence on nearly all matters dealing with the arbitral 
process gives arbitrators and parties flexibility and creativity within the 
forum.
141
  Parties can then craft a process that meets their needs, and 
arbitrators can enforce the procedure chosen by contract in the manner that 
they see fit.
142
  With regard to ethical misconduct, the lack of statutory and 
common law gives arbitrators great flexibility to police their own tribunals 
if they choose to exercise that flexibility.
143
  If arbitrators abide by their 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 135  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. 
 136  See John Arrastia, Jr. & Christi L. Underwood, Arbitration v. Litigation: You Control the Process v. The 
Process Controls You, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2009–Jan. 2010, at 31, 32–34; Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell 
Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429, 443 (2004); Jessica 
Richardson & Rebekah Barlow Yalcinkaya, Speed, Efficiency and Flexibility: A Call to Return to Arbitration’s 
Traditional Roots, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111 (2009).  
 137  See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.  
 138  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). 
 139  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2)–(4).  
 140  See id. § 10. 
 141  See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) 
(noting that the parties have the ability to set their own choice-of-law clause given the FAA’s silence on the 
issue); see also Michelle Eviston & Richard Bales, Capping the Costs of Consumer and Employment Arbitration, 
42 U. TOL. L. REV. 903, 905 (2011) (noting with criticism that the FAA’s silence on the issue of fees consumers 
can pay for arbitration services leads to a situation in which varying arbitrators and provider organizations charge 
different amounts for those services); R. Jeremy Sugg, Interim Relief and International Commercial Arbitration 
in North Carolina: Where We Are and Where We Should Be Looking, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 389, 398–99 
(2008) (noting the wide gaps in the FAA and discussing the need for states to fill in issues of arbitration 
procedure where the FAA does not specifically speak to the issues).    
 142  See sources cited supra note 141.  
 143  See supra Parts IV, V.A.1.  
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powers as stated in the contract, they have considerable control over the 
process.
144
  Given their position, they should be the first line of defense in 
dealing with ethical issues arising in the forum.  Of course, the arbitrators 
must recognize this duty and take action despite monetary and social 
pressure to let things slide. 
2. State Law Is Likewise Liberal on Regulating Arbitration Conduct 
For the most part, the state law of arbitration mimics the federal law of 
arbitration.  Interestingly, Congress modeled the FAA after the New York 
Arbitration Act, and the states and the federal government have long 
simultaneously regulated arbitration.
145
  At the time of the enactment of the 
FAA, the common law of arbitration and state laws governed.
146
  By the 
mid-1950s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws convened and promulgated the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA).
147
  
As this section notes, neither the UAA nor the preceding statutory or 
common law gave much attention to the issue of participant ethics.
148
  
 
3. Early Statutory and Common Law Did Not Address  
Issues of Ethics  
 
For the most part, the common law and state statutes in place around 
the time of the passage of the FAA were silent on the issue of ethics.  As a 
practical matter, arbitrations at the time consisted largely of merchant 
disputes (i.e., business to business disputes) that disputed issues relating to 
goods sold (quality, timeliness, quantity, etc.).
149
  The arbitrators issued 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 144  See sources cited supra note 141.  
 145  See David Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 406 (2012) (noting how the drafter 
of the FAA drafted the legislation modeled on the New York law); Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, 
or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 395 (2012) (describing 
the FAA as having been “[m]odeled after statutes enacted in New Jersey and New York”); David M. Sholl, Note, 
It’s My Party and I’ll Arbitrate if I Want To: Are We Signing Away Our Right to Litigate Tort Claims?, 37 NOVA 
L. REV. 205, 213 (2012) (noting how the FAA was modeled after New York law already in effect at the time). 
 146  See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional Analysis, 
37 GA. L. REV. 123, 141 (2002) (noting how “courts used public policy and contract interpretation to prevent 
arbitration and enforcement of awards under varied state laws that applied before uniform acceptance of the 
FAA/UAA model.”). 
 147  Id. at 153. 
 148  See id. at 154. 
 149  See Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 
in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643, 675 (2012) 
(noting that the “original intended use of the FAA was for the business community to regulate among its 
members”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing 
468 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:443 
 
awards based on equity and business norms, not necessarily the law.
150
  At 
that time, arbitrators often worked as full-time tradesmen (not lawyers) who 
understood the norms of the particular industry at hand.
151
  Thus, the laws in 
place retained flexibility to deal with these types of trade and business 
disputes.
152
 
At common law, no subpoena power existed for arbitrators, and 
arbitrators could not compel the attendance of witnesses or the production 
of documents.
153
  While many states had statutory law allowing for 
compulsory process, the right was not uniform across the nation at that 
time.
154
  A treatise from 1930 (published five years after the passage of the 
FAA) expresses concern about parties trying to curry favor with the 
arbitrators through bribery and other bad actions.
155
  The treatise also 
mentions that inappropriate contact with the arbitrators—both in terms of 
hospitality offered and ex parte communications—could subject an 
arbitration award to later vacatur by the courts.
156
  With respect to party 
misconduct affecting evidence, the treatise contemplates the possibility and 
guesses that an award based on such trickery and deceit would be subject to 
vacatur:   
 It remains to observe the case where a party resorts to false evidence 
and trickery to win his case.  Is a party under any obligation to act in good 
faith and aid the arbitrators, as lay judges of his own choosing, to an 
honest judgment upon the merits of the case?  Rules of the law of evidence 
and court procedure . . . are largely removed.  If a party may not subserve 
his own ends by bribes, secret influence and surreptitious reports against 
the adverse party, may he, notwithstanding, take the benefit of perjured 
evidence and trickery in the formal presentation of his case before lay 
arbitrators?  Strange as it seems, the cases are not entirely in accord upon 
this question.  The prevailing view, however, is that a party may not have 
the benefit of his perjury and trickery; his award will be vacated for such 
                                                                                                                           
Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240–41 (2012) (noting that traditional arbitration involves 
self-regulation within the normative community of a trade association). 
 150  See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 849 (1961) (describing 
arbitration within a trade association). 
 151  Id. at 854 (“Mercantile disputes have been decided by merchants in the Anglo-American world 
since at least the thirteenth century.”). 
 152  See id. at 854–55. 
 153  WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS 390 (1930). 
 154  See id. at 391–420 (citing statutes in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nevada, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). 
 155  Id. at 472 (“Bribery, by a party, of any one of the arbitrators is, of course, sufficient cause to 
invalidate an award rendered in favor of such party.”). 
 156  Id. at 473–74.  
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action.
157
   
This passage is particularly interesting because it recognizes the 
possibility for participant misconduct, but does not discuss the arbitrator’s 
role in dealing with the wrongdoing.
158
  These passages from the 1930 
treatise consist primarily of the courts’ response to unethical conduct after 
the fact and not on dealing with the conduct in the first instance at the 
tribunal level.
159
   
Although arbitrators have significant discretion in conducting their 
hearings, arbitrators at the time did not believe they had any real discretion 
to exclude evidence.
160
  Because the rules regarding vacatur allow a party to 
vacate an award on the arbitrator’s refusal to consider evidence (as opposed 
to considering improper evidence),
161
 arbitrators at the time of the passage 
of the FAA were, like present-day arbitrators, particularly unlikely to 
exclude evidence under any circumstances.
162
  This preference towards 
admitting evidence particularly hurts parties acting in good faith because 
they are abiding by the rules, while a less scrupulous participant is stacking 
the deck in his favor. 
Perhaps one of the reasons why the idea of perjury was lacking from the 
discussion of arbitrator powers at the time of the passage of the FAA was 
because witnesses at the hearings were not (and still are not) required to 
testify under oath.
163
  If no oath is given, then witnesses cannot possibly 
commit perjury, which requires a false statement under oath.
164
  Even if an 
oath was administered, courts at the time of the passage of the FAA were 
hesitant to find perjury within the arbitral forum.
165
  The Sturges treatise 
cites a Missouri case from 1837, in which the court found that no action for 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 157  Id. at 474 (citing cases from Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, West Virginia, and Tennessee). 
 158  See id. 
 159  See source cited supra notes 155–58.   
 160  STURGES, supra note 153, at 480.  In fact, many state statutes at the time required arbitrators to 
hear all evidence brought before the tribunal, using the mandatory “shall” language.  See id. at 483–86 
(citing statutes from Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, and Wisconsin 
for the proposition of mandatory consideration of evidence by the tribunal).  
 161  See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012); see also STURGES, supra note 153, at 486 (citing the following 
states as having a vacatur provision similar to FAA Section 10: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Wyoming).    
 162  See sources cited supra note 161.  
 163  STURGES, supra note 153, at 486 (“Apparently it is not necessary for witnesses to be sworn in a 
common law arbitration unless the parties require it.”). 
 164  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1254 (9th ed. 2009).  
 165  See STURGES, supra note 153, at 487.  
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perjury could exist despite alleged lying “under oath” because the oath was 
“‘voluntary,’” “‘extrajudicial,’” and otherwise not required.166  The treatise 
rightfully expresses concerns about the holding of the Missouri case and 
posits that an oath administered in a jurisdiction that gives the arbitrators 
discretion to require testimony under oath might not be considered 
“voluntary” or “extrajudicial.”167 
Again, these sources largely concern the interplay between the courts 
and the arbitral tribunal and the effect of wrongdoing on an ultimate arbitral 
award.  These sources do not say anything about the powers of the 
arbitrators in administrating their own tribunals.  Perhaps the silence on the 
issue is obvious in that arbitrators have control over their tribunals and can 
exercise the authority that they wish, provided that it does not include the 
wrongful exclusion of evidence.
168
  Although these sources provide little 
guidance, they are instructive in that the primary legal concerns were not on 
the happenings of the arbitral tribunal, but on the legal ramifications of 
arbitrator actions and awards.
169
   
4. Uniform Arbitration Act Adds Little Guidance on the Issue 
In the 1950s, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws promulgated the UAA, which was approved by the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association in 1956.
170
  Ultimately, all fifty 
states adopted the UAA, or a similar version of the arbitration laws.
171
   
Like the FAA, the UAA is a relatively short piece of legislation that 
covers the “front end” and the “back end” issues dealing with arbitration.  
The UAA provides that agreements to arbitrate are valid and specifically 
enforceable.
172
  The UAA allows for the appointment of arbitrators when 
the parties have been unable to do so,
173
 and it specifies that the decision of 
a majority of the panel will be controlling on the parties, unless the contract 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 166  Id. (quoting Mahan v. Berry, 5 Mo. 21 (1837)). 
 167  Id. at 487–88 (citing statutes from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, and 
Washington). 
 168  Id. at 480. 
 169  See sources cited supra notes 155–58, 160–61, 163, 165 – 67.  
 170  UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT intro. (1956), available at https://www.aaau.org/media/5046/uniform%20arbitr 
ation%20act.pdf. 
 171  83 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D The Arbitration Contract—Making It and Breaking It § 32 (2005).   
 172  UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1–2 (making agreements to arbitrate valid and providing courts a 
mechanism to compel arbitration). 
 173  Id. § 3 (allowing appointment of arbitrators). 
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between the parties provides otherwise.
174
  Unlike the FAA, the UAA 
provides limited rules for arbitrators creating and changing awards,
175
 but 
like the FAA, the UAA provides for the courts’ involvement in confirming, 
vacating, and modifying an arbitration award.
176
   
The UAA gives arbitrators slightly more guidance on the hearing and 
prehearing procedures than the FAA.  The UAA provides that parties may 
be represented by counsel,
177
 cross-examine witnesses at the hearing, 
present evidence on their case,
178
 and obtain prehearing discovery in the 
form of subpoenas and depositions.
179
  While these statutes provide some 
guidance on the issue of how arbitrators should preside over their tribunals, 
that guidance is limited and does not address the issue of ethics 
violations.
180
  Again, the only indication of what to do in the event of ethics 
issues is in the review provision, which also allows for vacatur on the basis 
of “corruption, fraud or other undue means.”181  This provision, however, 
does not deal with the actions of the arbitrators at the tribunal, but the 
interaction between the tribunal and the courts.
182
 
Thus, again, the arbitrators do not have a lot of guidance from the states 
on these issues.  Perhaps the reason for the silence is the unspoken 
assumption that arbitrators are given wide latitude and discretion over the 
hearings themselves.
183
  Certainly, the statutory law (both federal and state) 
gives the arbitrators wide discretion due to the silence.
184
  In other words, 
statutory law does not prohibit the arbitrators from taking on the role of 
ethics enforcer.  In fact, given the limited guidance on the issue, arbitrators 
are undoubtedly in the best position to do so.  If arbitrators do not assume 
this role, no one will, and the forum will slowly devolve into one not worth 
using. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 174  Id. § 4 (regarding majority rule of arbitrators). 
 175  Id. §§ 8–10 (describing requirements for the award; allowing arbitrators to modify or correct awards in 
certain instances; and requiring the arbitrators to account for the payment of arbitration fees and expenses in the 
award). 
 176  Id. §§ 11–13 (dealing with confirmation of award; dealing with vacating an award; and allowing for 
modification of the award under limited circumstances); see also id. §§ 14–18 (dealing with administrative issues 
relating to court involvement on motions before the court on arbitration issues).  
 177  Id. § 6 (allowing for representation of counsel throughout the arbitration process). 
 178  Id. § 5(b) (regarding hearing procedures). 
 179  Id. § 7 (regarding witnesses, subpoenas, and depositions). 
 180  See id. §§ 1–25. 
 181  Id. § 12.  
 182  See id. 
 183  See infra Part V.B.1–11.  See generally UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1–25. 
 184  See supra note 183.   
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B. Arbitrators Are in the Best Position To Deal with Ethics Issues 
Without a doubt, arbitrators are in the best position to deal with ethical 
issues when they arise.  Arbitrators can deal with any ethical issues during 
the hearing, using a large number of tools to deal with the problems in the 
first instance.
185
  Arbitrators can address any of these issues upon a motion 
or inquiry by a party, but they are also able to raise the issue sua sponte if 
they choose.
186
  Given the extraordinarily limited interaction between the 
arbitral forum and the courts, including the limited grounds for review, 
handling wrongful arbitration conduct within the forum itself may be the 
only way for wrongdoing to be addressed.  With the ambiguous nature of 
the application of the laws on perjury, tampering, and other types of 
obstruction to the arbitral forum, arbitrators must be vigilant and responsive 
to participant misconduct.
187
  The arbitrators are, for the most part, the first 
and last stop to deal with these types of issues.
188
  Only the rarest of cases 
are overturned for participant “fraud,”189 and the criminal law will be of 
little help for those seeking to right participant wrongs.
190
 
Arbitrators are well equipped to deal with misconduct in the arbitral 
forum, and they already have all of the tools that they need, if they choose 
to do so.  Perhaps arbitrators do not currently consider themselves to be 
“ethics enforcers,” but they should.191  This section details the tools 
available to arbitrators that can be used in order to best police the arbitral 
forum—and these types of rules and regulations are already a part of our 
modern arbitration system.  This section first considers the rules of major 
provider organizations giving the arbitrators considerable flexibility in 
controlling the tribunal and maintaining decorum within the forum.  
Arbitrators also have the power to assess credibility of witnesses and other 
types of evidence, and they can impose certain burden-shifting analyses in 
order to try to rectify participant misconduct.  Finally, arbitrators do have 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 185  See infra Part V.B.1–11. 
 186  See supra note 112 and accompanying text.  
 187  See supra Part III.A–B. 
 188  See infra Part V.B.9.   
 189  Blankley, Arbitration Ethics II, supra note 19 (manuscript at 44).  
 190  See supra Part III.A–B. 
 191  In personal conversations regarding my previous two pieces on this topic, I heard from more than 
one arbitrator that this type of conduct simply does not happen in arbitration.  In fact, one arbitrator 
noted that no unethical conduct existed in the “thirty years” the person was in the arbitral practice.  The 
idea that not a single person had lied under oath, hid a document, or otherwise acted in an improper 
manner over the course of thirty years is simply unfathomable to me.   
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the ability to award sanctions in egregious cases, and those awards will 
likely be held up by a court if the award is challenged. 
If arbitrators utilize these tools, they will help ensure that the forum is 
fair and comports with the principles of due process and fundamental 
fairness.  While arbitrators bear the majority of the role in this process, the 
arbitral providers can also help by creating clearer rules and engaging in 
increased arbitrator education.  This section considers these ideas in turn. 
1. Provider Organization Rules 
Arbitrations can be classified in one of two ways: institutional or ad 
hoc.  An institutional arbitration is administered by a provider 
organization,
192
 such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA), 
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), to name a few.  Ad hoc arbitration proceedings are 
simply those that take place outside of an administrative institution.
193
   
While the parties ultimately control whether they prefer an institutional 
or an ad hoc arbitration proceeding, an institutional proceeding can provide 
the parties with a number of benefits.  Using a provider organization can 
help with administrative tasks
194
 and may provide a decision-maker that has 
been vetted by the institution.
195
  Perhaps the biggest reason parties choose 
to have a provider organization administer the case is to ensure that the 
proceeding is bound by a certain set of rules.
196
  Of course, some parties 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 192  See, e.g., Elizabeth Varner, Arbitrating Cultural Property Disputes, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 477, 499 (2012) (“The agreement should state whether the parties want to use an arbitral 
institution or ad hoc arbitration.”). 
 193  S.I. Strong, Navigating the Borders Between International Commercial Arbitration and U.S. 
Federal Courts: A Jurisprudential GPS, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 129 (2012) (“Arbitrations that are 
not administered by an institutional body proceed ‘ad hoc.’”). 
 194  See Varner, supra note 192, at 499–500; see also Joseph T. McLaughlin & Kathleen M. Scanlon, 
Updated: A Master Checklist For Drafting Contract Clauses in Transnational Matters, 27 
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 97, 104 (2009) (noting that provider organizations can help with 
administrative tasks as well as an award likely to withstand judicial scrutiny). 
 195  Maya Ganguly, Tribunals and Taxation: An Investigation of Arbitration in Recent US Tax 
Conventions, 29 WISC. INT’L L.J. 735, 740–41 (2012) (noting that in the international sphere, awards of 
arbitrators on the rosters of arbitral providers will likely be well regarded because of the standards in 
place by the organizations). 
 196  See, e.g., Jack M. Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Need for a Fully Developed and 
Comprehensive Set of Statutory Legal Rules, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 227, 278 (2011) (“There is 
obviously a substantial difference between including fifteen pages of detailed arbitration procedures and 
agreeing to arbitrate under a well-known set of institutional rules, which happen themselves to be fifteen 
pages long.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation”, 
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choose not to use an institutional provider because of cost and time 
considerations.
197
  Even if parties are engaged in an ad hoc proceeding, they 
can still choose to be bound to a certain provider organization’s rules.198 For 
instance, parties to a contract for an ad hoc proceeding might still require 
that “the arbitrator(s) follow AAA rules.” 
As a general matter, provider organization rules give arbitrators an 
extraordinary amount of flexibility in how they run their own tribunal.  The 
flexibility afforded to arbitrators extends to nearly all procedural matters, 
including ruling on evidence or motions, swearing in witnesses, and other 
issues relating to the orderly disposition of the arbitral process.
199
  This 
section sets out rules from three major provider organizations, both 
nationally
200
 and internationally,
201
 to demonstrate the great amount of 
discretion afforded to arbitrators. 
                                                                                                                           
7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 430 (2009) (“While arbitration need not be ‘administered,’ many 
business parties prefer to incorporate the rules of an administering institution or ‘provider organization’ 
in their agreement.”). 
 197  See, e.g., Graves, supra note 196, at 278 (“The parties may be attempting to save money by omitting any 
institutional reference.  In fact, this is exactly why parties sometimes choose ad hoc over institutional 
arbitration.”) (citations omitted).  A common perception in the arbitration field is that an administered proceeding 
will be more costly because of the added cost of administrative fees.  See, e.g., id.  Adding an administrator into 
the dispute resolution process also potentially lengthens the process because of scheduling difficulties.  See 
McLaughlin & Scanlon, supra note 194, at 101–02.  One study attempted to determine the costs differences in 
institutional and ad hoc proceedings, but the study found no statistically significant correlation between the cost 
of arbitration and whether the proceeding was administered by a provider organization.  Big Spends, But Also Big 
Awards: The Chartered Institute Surveys Arbitration Costs, 29 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 185, 185 
(2011).  In the study, approximately two-thirds of the cases used a provider organization, while the remaining 
one-third were ad hoc arbitrations.  Id.  
 198  Strong, supra note 193, at 129 (“[P]arties can decide to adopt procedural rules published by an 
arbitral institution, even if the process is not administered by that organization. These arbitrations are 
still referred to as ad hoc proceedings, even though they are governed by published procedural rules. 
However, most published rule sets require any parties using those rules to have their arbitration 
administered by the organization that promulgated the rules.”). 
 199  See id. 
 200  At the time of publication, the United States only has two major arbitration provider organizations, the 
AAA and JAMS.  See JON LEIBOWITZ ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION, at *3, *29 (2010), available at 
2010 WL 2788172.  Previously, a third major provider, the National Arbitration Foundation, was extraordinarily 
active in the area of consumer arbitration, but the NAF has become largely obsolete following a series of lawsuits 
claiming that the NAF had improper ties with some of the repeat player debt-collection claimants.  Id.; see also 
Nancy A. Welsh, What is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 405–
06 (2010); Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Turmoil in Arbitration Empire Upends Credit-Card Disputes, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 15, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125548128115183913.  
     201  See About ICC, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/ (last visited Mar. 22, 
2014).  
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2. The American Arbitration Association 
The AAA is quite possibly the largest arbitration provider organization 
in the United States, so starting with the AAA makes sense.  The AAA 
develops and maintains over forty different sets of arbitration rules.  AAA 
rules generally apply to subject-matter specific disputes.
202
  For example, 
the AAA has rules for commercial disputes, consumer disputes, real estate 
disputes, insurance disputes, labor and employment disputes, health care 
disputes, accounting disputes, and the like.
203
  Although many sets of rules 
are similar, they are tailored to meet the special needs of different 
industries.
204
  For the purpose of this discussion, however, a handful of rules 
from across a wide variety of disputes will be used for illustrative purpose 
to demonstrate the discretion afforded arbitrators as a matter of course. 
Arbitrators have powers over their tribunals from the moment that they 
are appointed.  Prior to the hearing, AAA rules allow arbitrators 
considerable flexibility to require parties to exchange information.
205
  This 
type of flexibility allows arbitrators to resolve disputes about missing 
documents and witnesses that arise prior to the hearing.
206
  Arbitrators could 
use these types of rules to compel the production of documents and resolve 
disputes regarding potential forgeries.
207
  Many of the AAA codes also 
provide that an arbitrator can order “interim measures” that would allow for 
the preservation of evidence.
208
  If an arbitrator were to hear that one party 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 202  See Search Rules, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, http://www.adr.org/aaa (follow “Rules and 
Procedures” hyperlink; then follow “Rules” hyperlink). 
 203  See id.  Currently, the AAA has seventy-four sets of rules.  Id.    
 204  See id. 
 205  See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 
(INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES) R. 21 (2009) [hereinafter 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES] (detailing the “Exchange of Information” rule) (“(a) . . . [T]he arbitrator 
may direct i) the production of documents and other information, and ii) the identification of any witnesses to be 
called. . . . (c) The arbitrator is authorized to resolve any disputes concerning the exchange of information.”); see 
also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 
(INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX CONSTRUCTION DISPUTES) R. 24 (2009) [hereinafter 
CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, HEALTHCARE PAYOR PROVIDER 
ARBITRATION RULES R. 20 (2011) [hereinafter HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
INS. ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 16 (2008) [hereinafter INS. ARBITRATION RULES]; 
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES 
(INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR LARGE, COMPLEX COMMERCIAL DISPUTES) R. 20 (2012) [hereinafter WILLS 
AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES].  The rules with explicit provisions for “Large, Complex Disputes” contain 
even more discretion on the issue of pre-hearing evidentiary exchanges.  See, e.g., sources cited supra. 
 206  See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 21. 
 207  See id. 
 208  Id. at O-4 (explaining the “Interim Award” rule) (“If after consideration the emergency arbitrator is 
satisfied that the party seeking the emergency relief has shown that immediate and irreparable loss or damage 
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or another might discard or otherwise spoil evidence, the arbitrator would 
be able to provide for an interim measure to keep the parties from 
destroying valuable evidence.
209
 
At the hearing, the arbitrator can require witnesses to testify under oath 
as a matter of course or if they are concerned about the veracity of witness 
testimony.
210
  In addition to their statutory powers to subpoena witnesses 
and documents, arbitrators also hold this power by virtue of the arbitral 
rules.
211
  Arbitrators, then, have the power to subpoena witnesses who have 
been difficult to find or otherwise uncooperative in the prehearing 
process.
212
  At the hearing, the arbitrator has wide latitude on evidentiary 
matters and can admit or exclude evidence under a broad, discretionary 
standard.
213
  Under this type of rule, an arbitrator has the discretion to refuse 
                                                                                                                           
will result in the absence of emergency relief, and that such party is entitled to such relief, the emergency 
arbitrator may enter an interim award granting the relief and stating the reasons therefore.”); see also AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES R. 32 (2009) [hereinafter 
EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES (INCLUDING SAMPLE 
CLAUSES AND MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION RULES) R. 32 (2009) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL FINANCE 
RULES]; HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at O-4; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, PROF’L 
ACCOUNTING AND RELATED SERVS. DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES R. 34 (2009) [hereinafter PROF’L 
ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, REAL ESTATE INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES 
(INCLUDING A MEDIATION ALTERNATIVE) R. 36 (2009) [hereinafter REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION RULES]; 
WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 34, O-4.   
 209  See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at O-4. 
 210  COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 25 (detailing the rule on “Oaths”) (“The 
arbitrator may require witnesses to testify under oath administered by any duly qualified person and, if it is 
required by law or requested by any party, shall do so.”); see also COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES, supra note 
208, at R. 25; CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 27; EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 208, at R. 25; HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 24; INS. ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 205, at R. 20; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, LABOR ARBITRATION RULES R. 23 (2013); PROF’L 
ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 27; REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at 
R. 29; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 24; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WIRELESS 
INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES R. 26 (2009). 
 211  COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 31(d) (detailing the rule on “Evidence”) (“An 
arbitrator or other person authorized by law to subpoena witnesses or documents may do so upon the request of 
any party or independently.”); see also CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 33(d); 
HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 30(d); AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, HOME CONSTR. 
ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES ARB-32(d) (2007) [hereinafter HOME CONSTR. 
ARBITRATION RULES]; INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 25(d); LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 210, at R. 27; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 31; REAL ESTATE 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 33; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 
31(d); WIRELESS INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 30. 
 212  See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 31(d). 
 213  COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 31(b) (explaining further the rule on 
“Evidence”) (“The arbitrator shall determine the admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered 
and may exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant.”); see also COMMERCIAL 
FINANCE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 29; CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 33(b); 
HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 30(b); HOME CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra 
note 211, at ARB-32(b); INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 25(b); LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 210, at R. 27; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 31; REAL ESTATE 
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to admit evidence that appears to be false or can simply consider the value 
of the evidence “for what it’s worth” at the time the arbitrators render an 
award.
214
  With respect to their award, arbitrators have great flexibility to  
render an award that is “just and equitable,” provided the award falls within 
the grant of the arbitrators’ powers.215  These awards can, therefore, reflect 
misconduct occurring within the tribunal and right the wrong at the first 
level.
216
  Finally, the arbitrator has great discretion to interpret the rules “as 
they relate to the arbitrator’s powers and duties,”217 which gives added 
flexibility to deal with situations, like participant misconduct, not directly 
addressed in the rules. 
The AAA rules, however, suffer from a lack of specificity on the issue 
of ethics enforcement, and the rules would be greatly improved if they gave 
arbitrators the specific ability to remedy ethical wrongs in the forum.  Once 
rules are in place, the AAA would also have to educate its arbitrators on 
those new rules and the continuing obligation on arbitrators to ensure that 
the process is fair and comports with minimum due process 
requirements.  Given the AAA’s commitment to due process (though the 
use of Due Process Protocols), this type of change would fit well within the 
AAA’s mission.  Such a simple change would greatly cue arbitrators to 
their role in the process. 
3. JAMS Rules 
JAMS is a provider organization specializing in providing former 
judiciary employees as mediators and arbitrators.
218
  Like the AAA, JAMS 
                                                                                                                           
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 33; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 
31(b); WIRELESS INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 30.  
 214  See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 30(b). 
 215  COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43(a) (detailing the rule for “Scope of 
Award”); see also COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 41; CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 205, at R. 45; EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 39; HEALTHCARE 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 42; HOME CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 211, at ARB-
43; INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 35; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, 
at R. 43; REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 45; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43; WIRELESS INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 41.  
 216  See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43. 
 217  COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 53 (detailing the “Interpretation and 
Application of Rules”); see also COMMERCIAL FINANCE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 16; CONSTRUCTION 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 8; EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 208, at R. 48; 
HEALTHCARE ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 53; HOME CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 
211, at ARB-49; INS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 43; LABOR ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 
210, at R. 47; PROF’L ACCOUNTING DISPUTE RULES, supra note 208, at R. 52; REAL ESTATE ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 208, at R. 55; WILLS AND TRUSTS ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 53; WIRELESS 
INDUS. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 210, at R. 52.  
 218  About JAMS, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., 
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provides neutrals and administrative support for a wide variety of cases, but 
JAMS has far fewer sets of rules than the AAA, with a large number of 
disputes falling under the “JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and 
Procedures.”219  This set of rules provides the basic outline of an arbitration 
administered by JAMS, which contains ample flexibility for arbitrators to 
address ethical issues and other types of participant wrongdoing.
220
  Unlike 
the AAA rules, the JAMS rules have already taken steps to help eradicate 
unethical conduct in the forum. 
Under JAMS rules, prior to the arbitration hearing, the parties have a 
duty to engage in a “good faith” exchange of documentary evidence, 
including electronically stored information (ESI).
221
  Information not 
exchanged prior to the hearing can be excluded at the hearing as a 
consequence for nondisclosure.
222
  This “good faith” requires participants to 
act in an ethical manner and not hide documentary evidence, and the 
arbitrator can certainly remind the parties of their obligation and try to 
determine whether the parties meet their obligations.
223
  In addition to the 
parties’ obligations, the arbitrator has discretion to rule on discovery 
disputes
224
 and to issue subpoenas for witnesses and documents.
225
  
                                                                                                                           
http://www.jamsadr.com/aboutus/xpqGC.aspx?xpST=AboutUs(last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  JAMS 
neutrals are not exclusively former judges, but the organization prides itself in having a large roster with 
judicial experience.  Id.  The organization’s website boasts: “Nearly 300 full-time neutrals, including 
retired judges and attorneys with proven track records.”  Id.   
 219  See generally JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION 
RULES AND PROCEDURES (2010) [hereinafter JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES], available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration/ (follow “English” hyperlink).  JAMS does have 
additional rules for class action, construction, employment, expedited (e.g., streamlined), and international 
arbitrations. See ADR Clauses, Rules, and Procedures, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., 
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-clauses/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).  
 220  See sources cited supra note 219.  
 221  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 17(a); see also JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATIONS SERVS., JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 13(a) (2009) 
[hereinafter JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES]; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., 
JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 17(a) (2009) [hereinafter JAMS ENG’G 
AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES]; JUDICIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION SERVS., EMP’T ARBITRATION 
RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 17(a) (2009) [hereinafter JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES].  
 222  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 17(c); see also JAMS STREAMLINED 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 13(b); JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 
221, at R. 17(c); JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17(c).  
 223  See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 17. 
 224  Id. at R. 17(d); see also JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 13(c); JAMS 
ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17(d); JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, 
supra note 221, at R. 17(d).  
 225  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 21 (securing witnesses and documents for the 
arbitration hearing); see also JAMS STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 16; JAMS ENG’G 
AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17(d); JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 
221, at R. 21.   
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Arbitrators who become aware of unethical conduct can deal with these 
types of issues on motion and try to resolve them even prior to the hearing. 
As with the AAA rules, the arbitrators are afforded a great deal of 
discretion.  Unlike the AAA rules, those discretionary rules are largely 
contained in the same provision.
226
  JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration 
Rules and Procedures, Rule 22 gives the arbitrators a wide scope of power, 
including: (1) discretion to “vary the procedures if it is deemed reasonable 
and appropriate,” (2) discretion to require that witnesses testify under oath, 
(3) flexibility to consult (but not be bound by) court evidentiary codes and 
procedures, and (4) flexibility to re-open a hearing prior to issuing an award 
for “good cause shown.”227  These rules give considerable flexibility and 
tools for an arbitrator to deal with ethical issues arising during the hearing 
process.
228
  Arbitrators are free to disregard tainted evidence or issue orders 
to rectify unethical conduct.
229
  Arbitrators also have the ability under these 
rules to issue “whatever interim measures are deemed necessary” to 
preserve evidence or otherwise maintain a fair forum.
230
 
The JAMS rules recognize that attorneys and participants may not 
always act ethically and in good faith.  To this end, the JAMS rules allow 
arbitrators to issue sanctions against parties who do not comply with the 
rules.
231
  Rule 29 of the JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and 
Procedures gives the arbitrator the following powers: 
The Arbitrator may order appropriate sanctions for failure of a Party to 
comply with its obligations under any of these Rules.  These sanctions 
may include, but are not limited to, assessment of Arbitration fees and 
Arbitrator compensation and expenses; assessment of any other costs 
occasioned by the actionable conduct, including reasonable attorneys’ 
fees; exclusion of certain evidence; drawing adverse inferences; or, in 
extreme cases, determining an issue or issues submitted to Arbitration 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 226  See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 22. 
 227  Id. at R. 22 (detailing how the arbitration hearing will proceed); see also JAMS STREAMLINED 
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 17; JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 
221, at R. 22; JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 22.  
 228  See sources cited supra note 227.  
 229  See sources cited supra note 227.  
 230  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 24 (detailing the “Awards” rule); see also JAMS 
STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 19; JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 221, at R. 24; JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 24.   
 231  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29 (detailing the “Sanctions” rule); see also JAMS 
STREAMLINED ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 24; JAMS ENG’G AND CONSTR. ARBITRATION 
RULES, supra note 221, at R. 29; JAMS EMP’T ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 221, at R. 29.   
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adversely to the Party that has failed to comply.
232
 
This sanctions rule allows arbitrators to right ethical wrongs in the first 
instance.  While the previous rules give arbitrators the ability to require 
production of documents, support maintaining documents, and encouraging 
truthful testimony through testimony under oath,
233
 the rule regarding 
sanctions goes further by giving arbitrators the authority to assess monetary 
damages or apply burden-shifting presumptions to right ethical wrongs.
234
  
 In this respect, JAMS is ahead of many of its institutional counterparts 
in terms of regulating participant conduct.  These JAMS rules serve as a 
good starting point for other organizations to consider adding ethical 
conduct rules.  In addition, JAMS would be well served to train their 
arbitrators on issues of ethical conduct, helping them understand that 
arbitrators are the first and last true line of defense for a fair 
forum.  Principles of fundamental fairness and due process require that 
JAMS and other provider organizations keep arbitrators informed of their 
duties as “ethics enforcer” and ultimate gatekeeper of the process.  
4. International Chamber of Commerce 
Although this paper concerns domestic arbitration, as opposed to 
international arbitration, it is worth noting some of the highlights of at least 
one major international arbitral provider.  As noted above,
235
 parties can 
choose to be bound by rules of a provider organization, even if they do not 
ultimately use that provider organization to administer the proceeding.  In 
other words, parties to a contract could pick an international set of 
arbitration procedures, but agree to have the “seat” of the arbitration in the 
United States.  This option might be particularly attractive to international 
parties or parties who are familiar with a specific set of international 
rules.
236
  For illustrative purposes, this section considers the rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, a large organization devoted to 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 232  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29. 
 233  See supra notes 221–30 and accompanying text.  
 234  See JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29. 
 235  See supra note 198 and accompanying text.   
 236  See source cited supra note 195.  
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worldwide business policy issues.
237
  The ICC also provides dispute 
resolution services through the ICC International Court of Arbitration.
238
   
Under the ICC rules, arbitrators have great flexibility to design 
procedures to make arbitration a cost and time-effective manner of dispute 
resolution for the parties.
239
  The arbitrators’ primary responsibility is to 
determine the facts of the case, and they have a number of tools to help 
them do so.
240
  As is common in international arbitrations, the arbitrators 
may consider long affidavits in lieu of directly examining testimony, or 
they may require the attendance of witnesses at hearings.
241
  Arbitrators 
concerned about perjured testimony or falsified documents would have the 
power to independently request additional evidence on those points in order 
to quell their concerns.
242
  The ICC rules also have a provision allowing 
arbitrators to issue interim awards, which, broadly read, could include an 
award requiring parties to maintain evidence to ensure its preservation.
243
  
Arbitrators working under these rules can also tax arbitration costs to a 
party who engaged in certain types of misconduct—especially if the 
misconduct prolongs the dispute resolution process.
244
  As with the other 
sets of rules, the arbitrator has great flexibility to interpret all of the rules—
and gaps in the rules—to promote fair dispute resolution.245   
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 237  See generally INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ICC) RULES OF ARBITRATION (Int’l Chamber of 
Commerce 2010) [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-
Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Rules-of-arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/. 
 238  Functions of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/About-ICC/Organization/Dispute-Resolution-Services/ICC-International-Court-of-
Arbitration/Functions-of-the-ICC-International-Court-of-Arbitration/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
 239  ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 237, at art. 22(1) (“The arbitral tribunal and the parties shall make 
every effort to conduct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to the 
complexity and value of the dispute.”); id. at art. 24(2) (“During or following such conference, the arbitral 
tribunal shall establish the procedural timetable that it intends to follow for the conduct of the arbitration.  The 
procedural timetable and any modifications thereto shall be communicated to the Court and the parties.”). 
 240  See id. at art. 25, 26. 
 241  Id.  (requiring arbitrators to act in an expeditious manner; giving the arbitrators flexibility over the 
manner in which they determine facts; giving the arbitrators the power to request additional information or expert 
opinions; and allowing arbitrators to hold hearings as necessary). 
 242  See id. at art. 25. 
 243  See id. at art. 28.   
 244  Id. at art. 37 (“In making decisions as to costs, the arbitral tribunal may take into account such 
circumstances as it considers relevant, including the extent to which each party has conducted the arbitration in 
an expeditious and cost-effective manner.”).  
 245  Id. at art. 19 (“The proceedings before the arbitral tribunal shall be governed by the Rules and, where the 
Rules are silent, by any rules which the parties or, failing them, the arbitral tribunal may settle on, whether or not 
reference is thereby made to the rules of procedure of a national law to be applied to the arbitration.”); id. at art. 
41 (“In all matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the Court and the arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit 
of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable at law.”).   
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Thus, arbitrators practicing under a set of rules promulgated by a 
respected provider organization already have a number of tools to deal with 
unethical issues.  The rules often provide a direct answer—or at least 
indirect support—to deal with lying witnesses, absent witnesses, tampered 
documents, hidden documents, and other types of misconduct within the 
arbitral forum.
246
  These types of rules give the arbitrators little excuse for 
not addressing unethical behavior in the first instance prior to or at the 
hearing, or whenever the issue arises by the parties or sua sponte.  The 
rules, however, could be strengthened by specifically adding provisions 
regarding participant misconduct and the ability of arbitrators to sanction 
wrongdoers for violating the rules. 
5. Assessing Credibility Through Live Witness Testimony 
When arbitrators conduct hearings, they will undoubtedly assess the 
credibility of witnesses and observe the demeanor of the parties and 
counselors.  Although this particular “tool” for arbitrators may seem 
obvious, it is a valuable and readily available way for arbitrators to curb 
lying in arbitration, and may help resolve any lingering questions about the 
genuineness of documents.
247
  
The tradition in common law countries, such as the United States, is for 
arbitrators to hold live hearings with witnesses who testify on both direct 
and cross-examination.
248
  In contrast, witness testimony plays a less 
important role in civil law systems and written statements often replace the 
witness’ direct testimony.249  Arbitration, with roots in both systems, 
provides parties the option to choose either type of system.
250
  Arbitrators 
have great flexibility to hear witness testimony—under direct examination, 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 246  See supra Part V.B.2–4. 
 247  See Ariana R. Levinson, Lawyering Skills, Principles and Methods Offer Insight as to Best Practices for 
Arbitration, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2008). 
 248  See, e.g., John A. Wolf & Kelly M. Preteroti, Written Witness Statements—A Practical Bridge of 
the Cultural Divide, DISP. RESOL. J., May–July 2007, at 82, 84 (“The right of confrontation has long 
been a bedrock principle in common law litigation.  As a result, written witness statements are generally 
considered inadmissible hearsay.”). 
 249  Id. at 85 (“Written witness statements replace direct oral testimony of the parties’ witnesses.”); 
see also Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2004) 
(“[M]ost disputes between customers and brokers involve issues of credibility, and the arbitrator has no 
opportunity to assess the credibility of the parties.  Under the current system, the arbitrator can call a 
hearing to resolve these issues, but arbitrators understandably may be reluctant to do so, since it defeats 
the purpose of a simplified arbitration.”). 
 250  See Kimberly R. Wagner, The Perfect Circle: Arbitration’s Favors Become Its Flaws in an Era of 
Nationalization and Regulation, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. J. 159, 164 (2012). 
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cross-examination, or both—or to conduct  “paper proceedings,” in which 
no live testimony takes place at all.
251
  While paper proceedings and limited 
witness testimony promotes the efficiency of the arbitration proceeding, 
limited contact with witnesses (fact and expert) can deprive the arbitral 
tribunal of valuable contextual information.
252
 
Live witness testimony gives the arbitrator a first-hand chance to assess 
the veracity of the witness.  Like trial judges, administrative judges, and 
other fact finders, arbitrators are in the best position to weigh conflicting 
evidence and determine the truth amidst varying versions of stories or 
outright conflicting testimony.
253
  If an arbitrator has questions about who 
to believe, the arbitrator can observe the demeanor of witnesses, including 
how they answer questions, the tone of their voice, the speed of their 
speech, and their body language, in order to determine who to believe.
254
  
Of course, none of these methods of assessing credibility and determining 
the truth are foolproof,
255
 but the arbitrators will likely be the only people in 
the room who will be unbiased and in a position to make that assessment.
256
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 251  See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 22. 
 252  Claude R. Thomson & Annie M.K. Finn, Managing an International Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. 
J., May–July 2005, at 74, 80 (“[Witness statements] do not substitute for a proper examination-in-chief. 
Second, having a direct examination affords the arbitrator an opportunity to assess the credibility of the 
witness while presenting evidence in his or her own words, without leading by counsel.”); Wolf & 
Preteroti, supra note 248, at 87 (“For example, if there is a concern that the arbitrators will not have a 
sufficient opportunity to assess the credibility of a particular witness, the arbitrator could order a brief 
direct examination.”).  
 253  See, e.g., Jones v. E.P.A., No. 2012-3167, 2013 WL 1316940, at *3 n.4 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 3, 2013) 
(“However, it is not the function of this court to ‘re-weigh conflicting evidence,’ so this argument 
[regarding credibility] does not provide a basis for upsetting the arbitrator’s factual findings.”); DuBois 
v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc., No. 11 CV 4904(NGG)(LB), 2012 WL 4060739, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
17, 2012) (“It is the role of the arbitrators to make factual findings, weigh evidence, and assess the 
credibility of witnesses.”) (citation omitted); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 701 v. CBF Trucking, Inc., 
No. Civ. 09-5525, 2010 WL 2400400, at *3 (D.N.J. June 10, 2010) (“However, it is the arbitrator’s role 
to assess a witness’s credibility and the Court may not overturn an award simply because it may have 
reached a different determination.”); Fairchild Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007) (“The Arbitrator had opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the reliability of the 
evidence, taking into account the record as a whole.”). 
 254  See Ronald J. Allen, Rationality and the Taming of Complexity, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (2011). 
 255  Consider the following passage cited in Allen, supra note 254: 
Is the witness sweating or twitching, and if so is it through innocent nerves, the pressure of 
prevarication, a medical problem, or simply a distasteful habit picked up during a regrettable 
childhood? Does body language suggest truthfulness or evasion; is slouching evidence of 
lying or comfort in telling a straightforward story? Does the witness look the examiner 
straight in the eye, and if so is it evidence of commendable character or the confidence of an 
accomplished snake oil salesman? Does the voice inflection suggest the rectitude of the 
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Arbitration offers a relatively unique opportunity for decision-makers to 
step in and question witnesses directly.
257
  Although American trial practice 
generally does not involve judges directly questioning the witness, domestic 
arbitrators will regularly ask witnesses questions in order to flesh out facts, 
clarify confusing points, and otherwise aid the arbitrators in making their 
decisions.
258
  Some arbitration procedures, such as those conducted by the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) specifically alert 
participants that the “arbitrators may also question these witnesses.”259  
Arbitrators, then, with lingering questions about conflicting testimony or 
the reliability of evidence cannot only observe witnesses’ testimony but 
also seek clarification on these issues by questioning witnesses 
themselves.
260
 
Relying on arbitrators to determine the veracity of witnesses is not 
without its drawbacks, however.  Empirical research demonstrates that trial-
level judges are not particularly accurate at determining the truthfulness of 
witnesses.261  If trial judges are not successful at distinguishing between 
truth tellers and liars, then arbitrators may not be any better.  Perhaps, 
though, vigilance to demeanor, voice tone, hesitations, body language, and 
contradictions could make all fact-finders more accurate in this regard. 
If arbitrators are vigilant during the hearing, then they can best assess 
the veracity of the witnesses and try to determine who is telling the 
truth.  Perhaps if arbitrators remain constantly aware and critical of the 
truthfulness of witnesses, they can make more accurate determinations 
regarding veracity.  If arbitrators can accurately distinguish between truth 
tellers and liars, the arbitral forum will be fairer. 
                                                                                                                           
righteous or is it strained, and does a strained voice indicate fabrication or concern over the 
outcome of the case? 
Id. (citation omitted); see also Danielle E. Chojnacki et al., An Empirical Basis for the Admission of 
Expert Testimony on False Confessions, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 31 (2008) (citing studies showing that even 
individuals trained in deception techniques have a difficult time in determining whether a person is lying 
based on the individual’s body language). 
 256  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 976.  
 257  J.S. “Chris” Christie, Jr., Preparing For and Prevailing at an Arbitration Hearing, 32 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 265, 277 (2008) (“The arbitrator may ask questions of witnesses and is generally given 
discretion to conduct the arbitration hearing to expedite resolution.”); Levinson, supra note 247, at 27 
(“Sometimes the arbitrator will intervene with questions for the witnesses.”). 
 258  See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 259  Hearings, FINRA ARBITRATION & MEDIATION, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation 
/Arbitration/Process/Hearings/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).   
 260  See, e.g., id. 
 261  See sources cited supra note 255. 
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6. Adverse Inference and Other Presumptions 
In the American legal system, if a party withholds documents in bad 
faith, the “victim” party can move for a jury instruction that the document 
would have contained information adverse to the nonproducing party.
262
  
The court determines whether the burden is satisfied and considers whether 
a party acted in bad faith.
263
  Awarding one party an adverse inference is a 
common remedy when a court determines that a party has spoliated 
evidence.
264
   
Arbitrators, too, can make adverse inferences in the event that a party 
acts in bad faith and spoliates evidence.  Because arbitrations do not involve 
juries, arbitrators who find that an adverse inference is warranted would 
simply apply the inference themselves when determining the award.
265
  In 
this way, the adverse inference would operate in the same manner as if a 
judge presiding over a bench trial were to find an adverse inference 
warranted in a trial proceeding.
266
  The arbitrator would simply determine if 
the adverse inference should apply, and if so, apply the inference.
267
 
Some arbitral provider rules, such as JAMS, specifically allow 
arbitrators to award an adverse inference as a sanction for unethical 
conduct.  As noted above,
268
 JAMS rules offer arbitrators a wide variety of 
sanctions, including the possibility of “drawing adverse inferences” in the 
appropriate cases.
269
  If other provider organizations incorporated this type 
of rule, no question would exist with respect to the availability of the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 262  See Reinsdorf v. Sketchers U.S.A., Inc., No. CV 10-7181 DDP (SSx), 2013 WL 3878685, at *19–21 
(C.D. Cal. July 19, 2013) (describing the standard for spoliation); Kostic v. A&M Univ. at Commerce, No. 3:10-
cv-2265-M, 2013 WL 3356263, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2013) (“Under the spoliation doctrine, a jury may draw 
an adverse inference ‘that a party who intentionally destroys important evidence in bad faith did so because the 
contents of those documents were unfavorable to that party.’”); Research Found. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Nektar 
Therapeutics, No. 1:09-cv-1292 (GLS/CFH), 2013 WL 2145652, at *10 (N.D.N.Y May 15, 2013) (finding no 
adverse jury instruction warranted under the circumstances); Drakeford v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., No. 1-11-
1366, 2013 WL 3296586, at *11 (Ill. Ct. App. June 28, 2013) (“In this case, the jury was allowed to draw adverse 
inferences from the fact that certain hospital documents and alleged handwritten notes were missing from the 
infant’s medical chart.”).  
 263  See Peeler v. KVH Indus., Inc., No. 8:12-cv-1584-T-33TGW, 2013 WL 3871420, at *4 (M.D. Fla. July 
25, 2013) (discussing the test for spoliation and the resulting adverse inference if the test is met); Gen. Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 961 N.Y.S.2d 142, 144–46 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (finding 
adverse inference warranted under the facts of the case).   
 264  See Cecilia Hallinan, Comment, Balancing the Scales After Evidence Is Spoiled: Does Pennsylvania’s 
Approach Sufficiently Protect the Injured Party, 44 VILL. L. REV. 947, 950 (1999). 
 265  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 954.  
 266  See id.  
 267  See id.  
 268  See supra note 227 and accompanying text.  
 269  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29.  
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adverse inference sanction.  Other provider organizations and the common 
law give arbitrators such flexibility (as noted above) to award sanctions, 
and this authority is well within an arbitrator’s inherent powers to manage 
proceedings.
270
  As discussed in more detail below, courts will largely 
affirm an adverse inference drawn by an arbitrator when a party withholds 
documents in bad faith.
271
 
Of course, using adverse inference remedies and other types of 
evidentiary presumptions are limited measures to deal with unethical 
conduct in the forum.  This type of sanction, traditionally, has only been 
utilized in the area of document destruction or willful, bad faith 
nonproduction.
272
  An adverse inference would not address other types of 
wrongful conduct, such as lying and falsifying documents, and would 
provide little help in this situation.
273
  But if arbitrators begin to use this 
type of tool, it would have the effect of leveling the playing field and 
ensuring that the parties receive a fair forum. 
7. Awarding Monetary Sanctions 
Another potential sanction for parties who act unethically and otherwise 
in bad faith could be the imposition of monetary sanctions on the wrongful 
party or law firm involved.  This type of sanction is also available in the 
American legal system.
274
  For instance, if attorneys sign a document in bad 
faith or commit discovery abuses, the law firm or the client may be liable 
for sanctions, such as attorneys’ fees to remedy the wrongdoing.275  
Arbitrators are also free to sanction parties for unethical conduct within the 
forum.
276
 
Much like the ability to apply adverse inferences, some arbitration 
codes already explicitly allow the use of monetary sanctions in the event of 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 270  See, e.g., Seagate Tech., L.L.C. v. W. Digital Corp., 834 N.W.2d 555, 563 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 58.  
 271  See infra Part VI.  
 272  See Wm. Grayson Lambert, Keeping the Inference in the Adverse Inference Instruction: Ensuring the 
Instruction is an Effective Sanction in Electronic Discovery Cases, 64 S.C. L. REV. 681, 685–687 (2013).  
 273  Cf. T. Patrick Gumkowski, Note, Protecting the Integrity of the Rhode Island Judicial System and 
Assuring an Adequate Remedy for Victims of Spoliation: Why an Independent Cause of Action for the Spoliation 
of Evidence Is the Solution, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 795, 814–816 (2005); Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis 
of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence - Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It 
Correctly?, 58 LA. L. REV. 837, 862 (1998). 
 274  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (allowing a court to sanction “any attorney, law firm, or party that violated 
the rule or is responsible for the violation” of the rule requiring the filing of pleadings in good faith); FED. R. CIV. 
P. 37(b) (providing for the possibility of sanctioning a party for disobeying discovery orders). 
 275  See sources cited supra note 274.  
 276  See, e.g., JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29. 
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party or attorney misconduct.  The JAMS sanction provisions specifically 
allow for such financial penalties in appropriate situations: “These sanctions 
may include, but are not limited to, assessment of Arbitration fees and 
Arbitrator compensation and expenses; assessment of any other costs 
occasioned by the actionable conduct, including reasonable attorneys’ 
fees.”277  The International Bar Association recently released the IBA Rules 
on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration as a guideline for a 
single set of rules for those from both common law and civil law 
countries.
278
  With respect to discovery issues, the rules require the parties 
to act in “good faith,” and the “Arbitral Tribunal may, in addition to any 
other measures available under these Rules, take such failure into account in 
its assignment of the costs of arbitration, including costs arising out of or in 
connection with the taking of evidence.”279  Other sets of rules give 
flexibility to the arbitrator that would likely give them plenty of authority to 
address discovery issues by issuing sanctions.
280
  If more provider 
organizations gave explicit flexibility to arbitrators to allow for the award of 
monetary sanctions, then this would be another tool that all arbitrators could 
use in order to correct misconduct and ensure a fair forum. 
Unlike the remedy of making an adverse inference, the remedy of 
sanctions could be used for any type of unethical conduct.  Sanctions could 
be appropriate to punish a party giving perjured testimony by awarding a 
disproportionate amount of costs onto the guilty party.  Sanctions for 
unethical discovery wrongs could include attorneys’ fees for discovery 
work (such as depositions or fees for preparing discovery motions) or an 
assessment of costs.  The arbitrator has considerable flexibility to right a 
wide variety of wrongs with financial consequences.
281
  This type of tool 
helps ensure that the forum is fair by compensating the wronged party for 
having to defend against unethical tactics. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 277  Id.   
 278  See generally INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INT’L ARBITRATION 
(2010) [hereinafter IBA RULES], available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=683 
36C49-4106-46BF-A1C6-A8F0880444DC. 
 279  Id. at art. 9, cmt. 7.  In comment 6, the IBA Rules also note the possibility that the arbitrator could 
employ an adverse inference or other presumption for wrongful non-disclosure of documentary evidence.  Id. at 
art. 9, cmt. 6.  
 280  See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 205, at R. 58. 
 281  See id.; JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29. 
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8. Sanctioning a Party by Dismissing a Claim or Defense 
For very serious wrongs, an arbitrator could impose the ultimate 
penalty—outright dismissal of a claim or defense.  This type of remedy for 
a wrong is rarely used in the American legal system, but it is an option in 
extreme cases.
282
  A court may sanction a party by dismissing a claim or 
defense if that party engages in serious misconduct, such as fabricated 
testimony (lay or expert) or reports, or other evidence.
283
  If perjury is 
serious enough, a court could impose this type of sanction if the court found 
that the remedy was appropriate under the circumstances.
284
 
Arbitrators, too, could dismiss claims or defenses as a remedy for 
wanton misconduct in the forum.  Again, the JAMS rules explicitly give the 
arbitrator this power, if the arbitrator chooses to exercise it.
285
  The 
flexibility in other sets of rules would probably also allow an arbitrator to 
dismiss a claim or defense for an egregious violation of ethical rules.
286
  
More explicit instruction from other provider organizations to give 
arbitrators this power would help provide a fair forum.  The ability to 
sanction parties by dismissing claims and defenses would serve both as a 
deterrent and as a remedial measure. 
Although the ability to dismiss a claim or defense is within the realm of 
what an arbitrator is permitted to do, arbitrators would likely be justifiably 
hesitant to actually resort to this remedy.  Unlike judges, arbitrators do not 
issue “default” judgments.287  If one party—usually the respondent—fails to 
appear, the claimant still must make a case and prove entitlement to the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 282  See, e.g., Warren v. Estate of Wade, No. 12-11037, 2013 WL 3927796, at *1 (5th Cir. July 31, 2013) (“In 
addition, we warn Warren that frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise abusive filings will invite the imposition of 
sanctions, including dismissal, monetary sanctions, and/or restrictions on his ability to file pleadings in this court 
and any court subject to this court's jurisdiction.”); Pietraroia v. Ne. Utils., 756 A.2d 845, 854 (Conn. 2000) 
(“[T]he sanction of dismissal should be imposed only as a last resort, and where it would be the only reasonable 
remedy available to vindicate the legitimate interests of” the other party and the court); Arzuman v. Saud, 843 So. 
2d 950, 952 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that trial courts should reserve the dismissal sanction “for 
instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious”).  
 283  See, e.g., Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco, L.L.C., 664 F.3d 71, 77–79 (5th Cir. 2011).  
 284  Id. 
 285  JAMS COMPREHENSIVE RULES, supra note 219, at R. 29 (“The Arbitrator may order appropriate 
sanctions for failure of a Party to comply with its obligations under any of these Rules. These sanctions 
may include . . . , in extreme cases, determining an issue or issues submitted to Arbitration adversely to 
the Party that has failed to comply.”). 
 286  See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER 
DISPUTES R. 12212 (2012). 
 287  See Roger Haydock, Setting the Record Straight About Contractual Arbitration, W. VA. LAW., Nov.–
Dec. 2006, at 12, 12 (“‘Default’ arbitration awards do not exist under FORUM rules.  If a respondent fails to 
answer, the arbitrator is required to issue an award based upon a ‘timely review of the merits’ of that claim.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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relief sought.
288
  Dismissing a claim or defense as a sanction would be a 
dramatic step for an arbitrator, and an arbitrator rightfully might refuse to 
grant this type of remedy on the basis that an award arising out of such a 
sanction might be subject to vacatur by the courts.
289
  Specifically, the 
courts can vacate an award if an arbitrator refused to consider evidence,
290
 
and issuing sanctions might be construed as a refusal to consider certain 
evidence.  The much safer ground for an arbitrator would be to consider the 
evidence “for what it’s worth” and then find against the party who has 
engaged in unethical behavior.
291
  The ability to use this remedy, however, 
is a powerful tool for either deterrent effect or for remedial use.  Having this 
type of extreme tool in the toolbox would help make arbitration a fairer 
forum able to effectively remedy wrongdoing. 
9. Continuum of Possibilities 
This section has demonstrated that arbitrators have a wide variety of 
tools at their disposal to become the first hand “ethics enforcers” of their 
own tribunals.  These measures can be as unobtrusive as asking a witness 
some clarifying questions to issuing monetary or other types of sanctions 
upon determining that wrongful conduct has occurred.
292
  The arbitrators 
who are on the ground and witnessing the conduct of the attorneys, 
witnesses, experts, and clients first-hand are in the best position to deal with 
ethical issues as they arise.
293
 
Arbitrators must embrace their roles as ethics enforcers and understand 
how they are likely the first and the last resort for dealing with unethical 
conduct in the forum.  Counselors, too, must become comfortable with 
taking these types of issues to arbitrators in the first instance because courts 
will not hear these types of motions while an arbitration is pending, and 
waiting until after an award is handed down would likely result in a waiver 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 288  See id.; Irene C. Warshauer, Electronic Discovery in Arbitration: Privilege Issues and Spoliation of 
Evidence, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2006–Jan. 2007, at 9, 14 (noting that there would be little likelihood for an 
arbitrator to issue a default judgment against a party for failure to produce certain types of electronic data). 
 289  See Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68, 78–79 (1st Cir. 2008) (vacating arbitration 
award based on arbitrator’s improper dismissal of a counterclaim as a sanction).  But see AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., 
Inc. v. Oxford Mgmt. Servs., 627 F. Supp. 2d 85, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that even if dismissal of 
counterclaim was a sanction, it did not warrant vacating the arbitration award).  
 290  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012) (allowing vacatur of an award when the arbitrators “refus[ed] to hear evidence 
pertinent and material to the controversy”).  
 291  See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text. 
 292  See supra Part V.B.5–8.  
 293  See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.  
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of the issue.
294
  If the arbitrators do not take steps to remedy ethical wrongs, 
those wrongs will likely go unpunished, creating an injustice for the victim 
parties.
295
  If ethical issues on a system-wide basis are not remedied, 
arbitration would become an unfair forum in which parties could resort to 
any means in order to “win.”296  Arbitrators, then, must be the first and 
likely the last resort for dealing with these types of wrongs unless and until 
the law changes to give additional remedies to deal with participant wrongs, 
such as changing the criminal laws and slightly loosening the standard for 
vacatur of awards based on participant misconduct.
297
 
 
10. Arbitrators Must Step out of Their “Comfort Zone” 
 
Admittedly, acting as an “ethics enforcer” is not a comfortable spot for 
anyone, much less an arbitrator.  As noted above, arbitrators are chosen on 
the open market, usually by the counsel for the parties.  Many people would 
like to be arbitrators, and the profession is a difficult one to break 
into.298  For the most part, being chosen as an arbitrator is an honor.  Being 
chosen as an arbitrator is also a potentially lucrative prospect.  Arbitrators 
can charge upwards of $500 per hour or more, depending on the type of 
case and the agreements of the parties.299  Arbitrators who perform well 
have the potential of receiving repeat business from the parties or their 
counsel.   
Given this situation, arbitrators may be hesitant to be as vigilant as they 
need to be in order to deal with misconduct in the forum.  Arbitrators may 
simply be blind to the fact that the parties who chose them would actually 
commit unethical conduct.  At a more cynical level, a worry exists that 
arbitrators would intentionally overlook unethical conduct on the part of a 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 294  If a party does not raise an issue to the arbitrator in the first instance, that issue is waived if an 
attorney later tries to use that theory as a basis upon which to vacate an award.  See Goff v. Dakota, 
Minn., & E. R.R. Corp., 276 F.3d 992, 998 (8th Cir. 2002); Porush v. Lemire, 6 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 
(E.D.N.Y. 1998).  
 295  See Bennett, supra note 80, at 39.  
 296  In my first paper on this issue, I referred to this potential for creating a landscape of unethical 
behavior as the “wild west” of adjudication.  See Blankley, Arbitration Ethics I, supra note 18, at 925. 
 297  See supra notes 186–92 and accompanying text.   
 298  See generally Sasha A. Carbone & Jeffrey T. Zaino, Increasing Diversity Among Arbitrators, N.Y. ST. 
B.A. J., Jan. 2012. 
 299  See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL FEE SCHEDULE (2010), available at 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004102; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSTRUCTION FEE 
SCHEDULE (2010), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004254; AM. ARBITRATION 
ASS’N, LABOR ARBITRATION RULES FEE SCHEDULE (2013), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/Show 
PDF?doc=ADRSTAGE2011024; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES FEE 
SCHEDULE (2013), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTAGE 2011226. 
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party or counsel who is a “repeat player” in arbitration (and likely to re-hire 
the arbitrator), especially in a case against a “one shot player” who will 
likely never again employ an arbitrator.   
Increased arbitrator education could hopefully alleviate some of these 
issues.  A tightening of the arbitral provider rules would also give increased 
guidance to the arbitrators about the tools available to them to right ethical 
wrongs.  Increased awareness of the arbitrators’ ethical duties will ensure 
that arbitration is a forum comporting with due process and fundamental 
fairness. 
11. These Types of Remedies Do Not “Litigationize” the Arbitral Forum 
Whenever any proposed changes to the arbitral forum involve the use of 
judicial remedies and procedures, questions arise as to whether arbitration’s 
inherent characteristics remain at the center of the process.  This proposal 
does include certain aspects of arbitrators using the same remedies as courts 
and other adjudicators, but it still remains true to the fundamental goals of 
arbitration—namely flexibility and finality.300  
 Flexibility is one of the greatest hallmarks of the arbitral process.
301
  
Parties choose arbitration because the parties can design the process and 
arbitrators have the power to award remedies not available to courts.
302
  
Giving arbitrators a wide array of tools to deal with ethical violations 
bolsters the flexibility afforded to arbitrators.  Arbitrators face similar types 
of problems as judges and other adjudicators,
303
 so it seems fitting that they 
would be afforded similar tools to deal with ethical transgressions.  Given 
that the arbitral forum is essentially a forum of equity,
304
 the more tools 
from which an arbitrator can choose, the easier the arbitrator can customize 
any type of sanction or penalty to the specific circumstances of the ethical 
violation. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 300  See discussion infra Part VI.  
 301  DAVID ST. JOHN SUTTON ET AL., RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION 1-024 (23rd ed. 2007).   
 302  Id. 
 303  See Boraks v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 517 N.W.2d 771, 772 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he function of 
arbitrators is analogous to that of a court and their duties require the exercise of judgment, like public judicial 
officers . . . .”). 
 304  The American judicial system, for the most part, is a forum of law; however, arbitrators have 
considerably more flexibility to act from a theory of equity.  Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales, 
Contracting Around the FAA: The Enforceability of Private Agreements to Expand Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 151, 175–76 (2002) (“Courts, unfamiliar with the structure 
and procedure of arbitration, would be placed in an awkward position of reviewing the creative and flexible 
remedies available to arbitrators with experience and expertise very different from that of the judiciary applying 
traditional theories of remedy and equity in arriving at final judgments.”).  
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In addition, arbitration is a forum that promotes finality and efficient 
dispute resolution.  Having an arbitrator deal with ethical wrongs firsthand 
would promote that all of the issues are resolved in one forum, and that 
multiple, related proceedings are not being undertaken in different forums.  
If arbitrators take a more active role in policing arbitral conduct, then all 
issues will be considered at the same time.  A losing party in arbitration 
could then move to vacate the entire award, including the rulings on the 
ethical issues.
305
  The reviewing court has limited grounds for vacatur,
306
 
but the court could consider all of the issues at once, with the arbitrator 
having already passed on the issue. 
Of course, not every ethical violation can be addressed to an arbitrator 
at the time it becomes known.  Some ethical wrongs only come to light at a 
later time after an arbitrator has already heard the case or while a case is 
pending appeal.  In those instances in which a party did not know or could 
not have known about the ethical wrongs, the wronged party should have 
the right to either request that the arbitration be reopened or to address the 
ethical violations with a court.
307
  Otherwise, the party would have waived 
the right to have the issue heard at all—either by an arbitrator or by the 
courts.
308
  These types of waiver rules, then, also help promote the 
arbitrator’s authority over the tribunal, as well as encourage the arbitrator to 
have the first opportunity to pass on every issue within the arbitrator’s 
powers.   
VI. COURTS AFFORD ARBITRATORS GREAT DISCRETION  
As noted above, the limited grounds for review insulate arbitrator 
awards from attack and promote the finality of the arbitral process.  Part of 
this arbitrator discretion, then, extends to arbitrators’ decisions on ethical 
issues, including the issuance of sanctions and other types of remedies for 
dealing with misconduct in the arbitral forum.
309
  
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 305  See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2012).  
 306  See id. 
 307  See, e.g., Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1359 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a party 
waives an argument in favor of vacatur if the party knew of the argument at the time of the arbitration and failed 
to make it to the arbitrator); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North Am., Local 195 v. Cross 
Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1121 n.19 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that a “‘loser is not permitted for the 
first time to raise an objection to the arbitration panel after the award has been made’”) (citation omitted); Stone 
v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 435, 455–56 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding that a party can waive an 
argument for vacatur of an arbitration award if the party “knew or should have known” of the argument but failed 
to make such argument to the arbitrator in the first instance).  
 308  See sources cited supra note 307.  
 309  See supra Part V.B.5–11. 
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For instance, in a recent case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 
the inherent powers of an arbitrator include the ability to sanction a party 
for misconduct.  In Seagate Technology v. Western Digital Corp.,
310
 the 
arbitrator heard an employment dispute for disclosure of trade secrets.
311
  At 
the arbitration, the respondent argued that the trade secrets were actually 
disclosed to the public, thus taking away their protected status.
312
  The 
arbitrator found that the “evidence” of public disclosure was fabricated, and 
the arbitrator sanctioned the offending party for creating fake evidence.
313
  
The arbitrator found that this “misconduct” warranted “severe sanctions,” 
including the preclusion of any evidence or defense “‘disputing the 
validity’” of certain trade secrets.314  Ultimately, the arbitrator found trade 
secret violations and ordered damages in the amount of $525 million, 
prejudgment interest of nearly $100 million, and post-award interest of 
more than $9 million.
315
  The trial court vacated the decision on the 
alternative bases that the arbitrator exceeded his powers or misapplied 
sanction law.
316
 
The court of appeals reversed on two grounds.  First, the court found 
that the sanctioned party waived this argument.
317
  The sanctioned party 
failed to challenge the arbitrator’s authority to issue sanctions at the 
arbitration hearing and, in fact, requested that the arbitrator sanction the 
other party.
318
  As to the arbitrator’s authority, the court noted that the 
arbitration proceeded under AAA rules, which are silent on the issue of the 
ability of an arbitrator to sanction a party for bad faith conduct.
319
  In this 
instance, the court found that, given the broad powers of the arbitrator and 
the failure of the contract to prohibit the award of sanctions, the arbitrator 
had the inherent power to issue sanctions.
320
  Ultimately, the court upheld 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 310  Seagate Tech. v. W. Digital Corp., 834 N.W.2d 555 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
 311  Id. at 558.  The arbitration agreement between the parties was broad, covering “any dispute or 
controversy arising out of or relating to any interpretation, construction, performance or breach of this 
Agreement.”  Id.  
 312  Id.  
 313  Id. 
 314  Id. 
 315  Id. at 559.  
 316  Id. 
 317  Id. at 561.  
 318  Id. 
 319  See supra Part V.B.2. (regarding the AAA rules and the interplay with participant misconduct).  
 320  Seagate Tech., 834 N.W.2d at 563.  The court also  noted that, while the AAA rules do not 
specifically speak to the ability to award sanctions, Rule 39 of the Employment Arbitration Rules and 
Mediation Procedures allow an arbitrator to grant “any remedy or relief” available to a party at court, 
including awards of attorneys’ fees and costs.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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both the arbitrator’s ability to award sanctions as well as the amount of 
sanctions awarded.
321
  The Seagate case demonstrates both the importance 
of the waiver and the arbitrator’s inherent powers.  This Minnesota court 
recognizes the important policies behind arbitrator autonomy and authority 
within the forum.
322
 
Similarly, in AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. v. Oxford 
Management Services,
323
 the Eastern District of New York considered a 
challenge to an arbitrator’s decision to dismiss counterclaims as a sanction 
for destroying documents relevant to the claims at issue.
324
  The underlying 
dispute involved a question of who had the right to pursue certain collection 
matters.
325
  With regard to the sanctions, the arbitrator found that Oxford 
“‘knowingly destroyed records necessary to resolve the disputes between 
the parties.’”326  As a sanction, the arbitrator dismissed Oxford’s 
counterclaims.
327
 The court found that, while the contract prohibited the 
arbitrator from issuing punitive damages, the arbitrator did have the ability 
to dismiss the counterclaims under the authority granted by contract and in 
the ambiguity of the AAA rules.
328
  Again, decisions like this one preserve 
the inherent authority that arbitrators have to ensure a fair forum and keep 
parties from acting in an unethical manner in the process.
329
 
These sample cases demonstrate the power afforded to arbitrators when 
those arbitrators take affirmative steps to deal with ethical issues in the first 
instance.  Having the arbitrators address ethical violations as they occur will 
allow the same decision-maker to rule on all issues relating to the process, 
provided that the parties do not explicitly remove this ability from the 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 321  Id. at 567. 
 322  See id.  
 323  AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Oxford Mgmt. Servs., 627 F. Supp. 2d 85 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 324  Id. at 90–91. 
 325  Id. at 89–90. 
 326  Id. at 91. 
 327  Id. 
 328  Id. at 96. 
 329  See also Hamstein Cumberland Music Grp. v. Williams, No. 05-51666, 2013 WL 3227536, at *4 (5th 
Cir. May 10, 2013) (holding that an arbitrator had inherent powers to sanction a party for discovery abuses); 
Jones v. PPG Indus., Inc., 393 F. App’x 869, 871 (3rd Cir. 2010); In re Arbitration Between United Pub. 
Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO and City and Cnty. of Honolulu Holiday Pay, No. 29710, 2011 WL 
2696394, at *11 (Haw. App. Ct. July 12, 2011) (“It is within the Arbitrator’s authority to impose discovery 
sanctions.”).  Interestingly, the Jones court involved a claim in which the arbitrator found an adverse inference 
against the respondent party and then still ruled in favor of the respondent.  393 F. App’x at 871.  The trial court 
and Third Circuit confirmed the arbitral award based a review of the extensive record in the case.  Id.  In Davis v. 
Reliance Electric Industrial Co., the arbitrator had grave concerns regarding the respondent-employer’s failure to 
provide certain critical documents, so the arbitrator awarded punitive damages against the employer based on a 
portion of the employer’s net worth.  104 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).   
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arbitrators.  Parties, as the masters of their agreement and ultimate designers 
of the process, could attempt to take the ability to sanction parties out of the 
hands of the arbitrator—but then it would be unclear who would retain that 
power.  As noted above, the courts have little ability to interfere with the 
arbitral forum—during or after arbitration.330  If the arbitrator does not deal 
with the ethical issue, it is very likely that no one will.
331
   
To date, the cases seem to suggest that the arbitrators are dealing with 
ethical issues regarding abuse of the forum, such as document or witness 
tampering.  These cases appear to center on parties who make these issues 
known to the arbitrator either at a hearing or in a motion before or after the 
hearing.
332
  Given the fact that many arbitrations involve pre-arbitration 
discovery, counsel and parties will likely be apprised of discovery abuses at 
an earlier time than the arbitrators.  But arbitrators should not rely solely on 
the parties to remedy unethical behavior in the forum.  They need to be 
watchful and determine whether the parties are acting in a way respectful of 
each other and of the forum.  Arbitrators should not be afraid to deal with 
unethical conduct sua sponte because if arbitrators neglect these types of 
issues, the ethical wrongs will likely go uncorrected, thus creating an unfair 
forum for the parties—particularly the parties that are playing by the 
rules.
333
 
VII. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER – HOW ARBITRATORS CAN ALSO BENEFIT 
FROM LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 
As mentioned above, I have previously advocated for legislative change 
in the area of arbitration ethics.
334
  This paper on arbitrators as ethics 
enforcers does not contradict my previous research, but instead explores a 
facet of participant ethics in arbitration and works in tandem with my 
previous research.  In fact, arbitrators, too, could benefit from a more 
clearly defined law regarding arbitration ethics. 
As things currently stand, the law is altogether murky as to whether 
wrongful conduct perpetrated in the arbitral forum is even prohibited or 
punishable by law.
335
  Perjury and tampering (both with witnesses and 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 330  See supra notes 310–29 and accompanying text. 
 331  See supra notes 310–29 and accompanying text. 
 332  See supra notes 310–29 and accompanying text. 
 333  See supra notes 293–97 and accompanying text. 
 334  See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.  
 335  See supra Part III.  
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documents) questionably apply to the arbitral forum.
336
  Dealing with 
ethical and potential criminal conduct at the arbitral award confirmation or 
vacatur stage also leaves a lot of conduct unaddressed because of high 
burdens of proof and waiver issues.
337
  Accordingly, the arbitrators are often 
the first and last line of defense to deal with wrongful conduct.
338
 
If the criminal law, however, were to change, this would arguably give 
arbitrators more authority to exert control over ethical issues in the process 
and sanction wrongful conduct.  Extending perjury and tampering laws to 
the arbitral forum would give an arbitrator additional gravitas when issuing 
an award for sanctions because the arbitrator could cite the criminal law as 
a basis on which to base his or her award.  A change in the criminal law 
would likely have a de minimis effect on criminal prosecutions in any event.  
Urging for a shift (or clarification) of the criminal law is meant to have a 
deterrent effect on arbitration and give arbitrators the legal backing to 
impose sanctions—it was not intended to turn arbitration into a police state. 
These propositions can work hand in hand.  Clarifying the law and 
modifying some of the review standards will not take powers away from the 
arbitrators.  Instead, extending the criminal law would reinforce arbitrator 
decisions and give arbitrators additional tools to manage their own forums.  
A slight shift in the review provisions in the event of participant 
misconduct—again, simply making the same standard available to all forms 
of review—would treat arbitrator decisions on ethical issues in the same 
way as every other arbitral decision.  These tools preserve arbitrator 
autonomy as the first (and likely last) authority on the conduct within the 
arbitral forum.  Utilizing these tools will ensure that arbitration is a fair 
forum comporting with due process. 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
 336  See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.  
 337  See supra Part IV.  
 338  See supra Part V.B.9.  
